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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This matter involves the final decision and order of the Fourth District Court in 
and for the County of Juab in the matter of Essential Botanical Farms v. Kay. As a 
result, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues in this appeal arose out of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment quieting title in plaintiff and appellee, Essential Botanical Farms (hereinafter 
"Appellee" or "EBF"), to a parcel of real property located in Juab County, Utah. In 
granting summary judgment in favor of EBF, the District Court concluded that the burden 
of proof in boundary by acquiescence (hereinafter "the Doctrine") cases is proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Even though the District Court held that the burden of 
proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is a preponderance of the evidence, the court 
stated that it would evaluate Appellee's claims based upon a clear and convincing 
standard. The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of EBF and 
against Steven L. Kay (hereinafter "Appellant", "Appellant Kay", or "Mr. Kay"), 
reasoning that evidence showing mere occupation up to a fence line and the subjective 
belief of two tenants that the fence line was the boundary were sufficient to prove 
acquiescence of Appellant's predecessors by clear and convincing evidence. In addition, 
even though the District Court stated that it evaluated Appellee's claim of acquiescence 
on a clear and convincing standard, Mr. Kay believes that in fact, the District Court 
applied a preponderance standard in granting Appellee summary judgment based upon 
the Doctrine. 
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Issue for review: Did the District Court err in concluding that the burden of proof 
where a court divests a record owner of fee title based on the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence? 
Standard of review: De novo. The burden of proof which the courts apply in a 
civil matter is an issue of law that appellate courts review for correctness. Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster, 2007 UT 42, \ 41, 164 P.3d 384. 
Issue for review: Did the District Court err in concluding that evidence that the 
predecessors of a defendant landowner occupied up to a fence combined with the 
subjective belief of two tenants that the fence was the boundary, in the complete absence 
of other evidence of the acquiescence of the defendant landowner or his predecessors-in-
title, was evidence sufficient to establish the defendant landowner's predecessor's 
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence? 
Standard of review: De novo. A district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 
UT 61,1(10, 639 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. "When an appellate court reviews a district court's 
grant of summary judgment, cthe facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are 
viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,' Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe 
Trust, 2004 UT 85, \ 2, 100 P. 3d 1200. The district court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness, MISCO, 
2005 UT 91,^17, 127P.3d697." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a small triangular piece of real property approximately six acres 
in size located in Juab County, Utah. The parcel is created by a fence line on the east and 
a deed line on the west, both of which run generally north-south. The parcel is narrow 
and triangular in shape with the point of the triangle pointing south. The east leg of the 
triangle (the deed line) and the west leg of the triangle (the fence line) are approximately 
2700 feet long. The third leg of the triangle, on the north end, runs east-west, and is 
approximately 130 feet in length. The parties to the present suit are adjoining 
landowners. Appellant Kay owns the property that comprises the triangle. That is, Kay 
owns the property west of the deed line and east of the fence line. Appellee owns the 
property east of the deed line. Appellee's predecessors have occupied the triangle and up 
to the fence for over forty years. The dispute between the parties is whether the fence 
line or the deed line is the boundary between Appellant Kay's property on the west and 
Appellee EBF's property on the east. 
The Complaint was filed in the Fourth District Court on or about May 26, 2005. 
Service of Mr. Kay was personal, and the return of service was filed on or about June 6, 
2005. Mr. Kay filed his Answer on or about June 24, 2005. 
On or about September 17, 2007, EBF filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment and a supporting memorandum. On or about October 25, 2007, Mr. Kay filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment and a combined memorandum in opposition to 
EBF's motion for partial summary judgment and in support of Mr. Kay's cross-motion 
for summary judgment. EBF filed a combined memorandum in opposition to Mr. Kay's 
Page 3 of40 
cross-motion and in reply and support of its motion for partial summary judgment on or 
about November 28, 2007. Finally, Mr. Kay filed his reply memorandum in support of 
his cross-motion for summary judgment on or about January 4, 2008. Oral argument was 
heard on or about March 13, 2008. The court took the matter under advisement, and on 
May 13, 2008, it issued a ruling in favor of EBF. Final judgment was entered on October 
13, 2009. Mr. Kay filed his notice of appeal on October 29, 2009. This Court elected to 
retain this appeal on its docket by order dated November 30, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The property involved in this appeal consists of approximately six acres 
located in Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, SLBM (hereinafter "Section 4"). 
R. 298. 
2. Section 4 is located in the Mona Valley, near Mona, Utah, in the valley 
floor. R. 298. 
3. When Section 4 was originally surveyed by the Office of the Surveyor 
General in 1856, the north quarter corner of Section 4 (hereinafter the utNorth Quarter 
Corner") was marked with a monument. R. 298. 
4. The original monument was a post in a mound of earth and pit. R. 298. 
5. Sometime after the location of the original North Quarter Corner 
monument, U. S. Highway 91 was built over the monument, which was destroyed. R. 
298. 
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6. In 2005, the North Quarter Corner position was prorated and a Juab County 
witness corner was placed sixty (60) feet east of the true corner, near the easterly 
boundary of the highway. R. 299. 
7. Based upon the notes of the original 1856 survey and the 2005 witness 
corner, the location of North Quarter Corner of Section 4 is accurately shown in a survey 
plat prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying which is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit A. Addendum, Exhibit A. R. 211, 298. 
8. On Exhibit A, the North Quarter Corner is an unmarked diamond midway 
between the NE Corner of Section 4 and the NW Corner of Section 4. Addendum, 
Exhibit A. R. 21, 297. 
9. The North Quarter Corner marks the northernmost point of a line extended 
(the "Quarter Section Line"), that divides Appellant's and Appellee's deeded properties. 
Addendum, Exhibit A. R. 211, 297. 
10. In the vicinity of the disputed property, the location of the boundary 
between the west half of Section 4 and east half of Section 4 is correctly shown in 
Addendum, Exhibit A. R. 211, 239, 297. 
11. Appellant's eastern deed line is shown on Exhibit A by the following 
courses and distances: N02°38'39"E 1349.46'; N02°38'38"E 1352.17'. Appendix, 
Exhibit A. R. 211,297. 
12. This eastern deed line to Appellant's property is 2701.63 feet long (1349. 
49ft+1352.17 ft = 2701.63 ft). Appendix, Exhibit A. R. 211, 297. 
13. While Appellee's property extends to the North Quarter Corner for a total 
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of 4051.78 feet (1349.49 + 1352.17 + 1350.15 ft - 4051.78), the property at issue in this 
appeal is only that between Appellant's and Appellee's property and is therefore 2701.63 
feet in length. Exhibit A. R. 211,297. 
14. The location of the fence at issue in this action is also accurately reflected 
in Exhibit A to the Addendum and is identified with an arrow and in printed handwriting 
on Exhibit A as "Fence". R. 239, 297. 
15. The fence in question has been in existence for over forty years. R. 233. 
16. Appellant Kay holds fee title ownership of the real property west of the 
deed line (the Quarter Section Line) and east of the fence by reason of a Warranty Deed 
recorded on June 20, 2004 as Entry Number 00235619, in Book 0466 at Page 0641, in 
the official records of the Juab County Recorder. Addendum, Exhibit B. R. 238. 
17. Appellee holds fee title ownership of real property east of the deed line (the 
Quarter Section Line) by reason of a Special Warranty Deed recorded on March 13, 
1998, as Entry Number 00212715, in Book 0391 at Page 0181, also in the official records 
of the Juab County Recorder. Addendum, Exhibit C. R. 238. 
18. Appellant's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Appellant's land from 
the United States in 1890. R. 297. 
19. Appellee's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Appellee's land from 
the United States in 1905. R. 297. 
20. Through mesne conveyances, Appellant's property was conveyed to 
Appellant in 2004. R. 237-238. 
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21. Through mesne conveyances, Appellee's property was conveyed to 
Appellee in 1998. R. 235-236. 
22. Beginning in the 1950's, Kay's predecessors dry fanned their side of the 
fence. R. 234. 
23. Kay's predecessors' farming activities continued until it was sold to Kay. 
R.234. 
24. Prior owners of Kay's property, John L. Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch 
Cloward, Olive and Daryl Stanley, have not testified in this case. R. 297. 
25. Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, who were relatives of owners John L. 
Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch Cloward, and Olive and Daryl Stanley, never owned fee 
title to Appellant's property at any time. R. 297. 
26. Tom Fowkes worked on Appellant's property from the time he was a small 
child. R.234. 
27. He continued to farm the land until the 1970's or even later. R. 234. 
28. Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Tom Fowkes 
testified as follows: 
Q: All right. . . . Looking again at the survey (Exhibit A to Appendix), 
just based upon your experience with the property and working on the 
farm, where did you understand the boundary to be between the 
properties we've been talking about [the Kay and EBF properties]? 
A: On the fence line. 
R. 234. 
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29 Dale Fowkes conducted farming activities on the farm until it was sold to 
Appellant Kay R 233 
30 Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Dale Fowkes 
testified as follows 
Q Okay Based upon your experience with the -- the property 
that we've been talking about and you've testified today what 
was your understanding where the boundary was between your 
family's property and the Andrews [EBF's] property7 
A The - fence-where the fence was 
R 232 
31 Appellee's predecessors ran cattle on their property m the 1950's R 230 
32 Later, Appellee's predecessors grazed their property R 227, 230 
33 Appellee's predecessors in title testified that they thought the fence was the 
boundary R 223-224, 226, 229 
34 The parties' predecessors never had any discussion or discussions about the 
lence, or whether the fence was or was not a boundary R 226, 227-228, 297 
35 From time to time, Appellee's predecessors Andrews' cattle would get 
through the fence R 296 
36 It was the working arrangement between the Andrews and the Fowkes that 
whoever was running cattle had the responsibility to maintain the fence R 296 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At its core, this case involves a taking That is, divesting a citizen of fee title to 
real property he purchased and which was conveyed to him m propeily executed, 
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delivered, and recorded documents of title. Real property rights enjoy constitutional 
protection under both the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution and the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Both due process clauses direct that as 
the importance of the constitutionally protected interest increases, so too should the 
burden of proof increase to protect citizens from the unjust deprivation of their 
constitutionally protected rights. Real property rights are among the highest recognized 
in the law in large part because real property is unique. In light of the importance the law 
affords real property rights, due process requires that a litigant who wishes to divest 
another of fee title to real property must prove his or her case by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
In the context of boundary by acquiescence, when one considers the high 
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence in connection with the evidence in 
this case, the fact that a landowner occupied up to a fence line combined with the 
subjective belief of two tenants that the fence line was the boundary cannot satisfy the 
degree of proof constitutionally required for such a taking. Also, while this evidence 
may establish the occupation element by clear and convincing evidence, allowing 
evidence of mere occupation to satisfy Appellee's burden to prove acquiescence would 
result in the merger of the occupation-up-to-a-visible-line elements of the Doctrine with 
the acquiescence element, thereby obviating a plaintiffs burden to prove each of the four 
elements of a boundary by acquiescence case. Importantly, the element that plaintiff 
would no longer be required to prove would be the element that forms the very core of 
the doctrine: acquiescence. 
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Because in the present case there is nothing in the record, other than the fact of 
mere occupation, to indicate that Kay's predecessors subjectively intended to recognize 
the fence as the boundary, EBF failed to prove acquiescence by Kay's predecessors by 
clear and convincing evidence. The District Court was therefore in error in both granting 
EBF's motion and denying Kay's motion. The District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of EBF should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to 
enter summary judgment in favor of Mr. Kay. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF IN BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE CASES IS 
PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
a. The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution Require that the Burden of 
Proof in Boundary By Acquiescence is Proof By Clear and 
Convincing Evidence. 
Owners of real property are protected against deprivation of their property rights 
under both the Utah and the United States Constitutions. See Utah Const. Art. I § 1 
("All men have the inherent and inalienable right to acquire, possess and protect property. 
. . ."); Utah Const. Art. I § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law."); United States Const. Amend. XIV ("No state shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . ."). The 
burden of proof in cases that might deprive a vested landowner of his real property rights 
is the essential mechanism that fulfills the mandate of the Due Process Clauses of Utah 
and United States Constitutions. As stated by the United States Supreme Court: 
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[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due 
Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to instruct the fact finder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the 
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). 
That is to say, due process requires the burden of proof to reflect society's tolerance for 
the risk of error in the particular matter. Id. 
This rationale applies with equal force to the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution. Indeed, this Court has recently adopted the Addington Court's rationale. 
Egbert v. Nissan North America, 2007 UT 64, % 12 FN 6, 167 P. 3d 1058. Furthermore, 
this Court has also stated that because the two due process clauses are so textually 
similar, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are "highly persuasive as to the 
application of [the Due Process Clause] of our state Constitution." Terra Util. Inc. v. 
Public Service Comrn'n, 575 P. 2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1978). That being the case, the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution also requires the burden of proof applied in the 
present case to reflect society's low tolerance for errors in real property boundaries. In 
light of the Addington Court's analysis, and this Court's analysis in Egbert, a review of 
our society's tolerance for error in adjudicating real property boundaries is therefore 
warranted. 
Tolerance for errors in real property boundaries in our society is exceedingly low. 
For proof of this fact, one need look no further than the existence of the land survey 
industry, the title examination industry, the title insurance industry, all of which are 
licensed and regulated by the state, as well as the records, indices, and plats that are 
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maintained in the offices of county recorders throughout the state. Each year, substantial 
public resources are devoted to recording, indexing, and platting documents, making 
them accessible to the world, all for the purpose of establishing and promoting the 
stability and accuracy of real property boundaries. Likewise, each year individuals spend 
substantial sums of money out of their own pockets for surveyors to pin point the 
boundaries of their properties, and untold dollars for title examination and title insurance 
to protect their real property interests. The continued development of increasingly 
accurate technologies such as laser and GPS surveying equipment also demonstrates the 
high value our society places on the accuracy of real property boundaries, and its 
corollary: society's extremely low tolerance for errors in the same. 
In light of this low tolerance for risk of error in locating real property boundaries, 
the Court's analysis in Addington, and this Court's analysis in Egbert, it is only logical 
that the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases must be proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. Requiring proof only by a preponderance of the evidence would 
offend due process requirements by giving short shrift to society's low tolerance for 
errors in boundaries between real properties and would fail to adequately protect rights 
our state deems so important that they are explicitly declared and protected by our state 
constitution. 
b. Other Legal Doctrines Altering Real Property Rights Require Clear 
and Convincing Evidence. 
That a higher burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence is required should not 
come as a surprise. A review of cases enlisting the judicial power of Article VIII of the 
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Utah Constitution to deprive a landowner of a real property interest discloses that in those 
cases, courts can only effect such a deprivation if this extraordinary exercise of judicial 
power is justified by clear and convincing evidence. Perhaps the most persuasive 
example is found in the doctrine of abandonment of easements. This doctrine, 
conceptually speaking, is essentially identical to boundary by acquiescence. The only 
difference between the two doctrines is the nature of the property interest at stake. 
Easement abandonment puts a servitude at issue while boundary by acquiescence places 
fee title at issue. In all other respects, the doctrines are conceptually indistinguishable. 
Under the law of abandonment of easements, clear and convincing evidence of the 
dominant estate's owner's intent to abandon is required when a party claims that an 
easement has been abandoned. Western Gateway Storage v. Tresdeder, 567 P. 2d 181 
(Utah 1977).1 
Similarly, a party that attacks the validity of a deed must prove his or her case by 
clear and convincing evidence. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984) (citing 
Controlled Receivablesy Inc. v. Barman, 413 P. 2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966) ("Before 
discussing the evidentiary facts, certain fundamental rules of law should be set forth. Of 
prime importance is the rule that one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must so prove 
by clear and convincing evidence.")). When a governmental entity enlists the judicial 
machinery to take private property against a landowner's will and dedicate it to public 
1 Because Kay believes that the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and abandonment 
of easements are so conceptually similar and therefore highly persuasive on both issues 
presented in this appeal, appellant will address below in greater detail the impact of the 
doctrine of abandonment of easements on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
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use as a road or highway, it is required to prove each element of its claim by clear and 
convincing evidence. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Similarly, a party seeking to burden a vested landowner's property without the 
landowner's consent by way of a prescriptive easement must prove each element of his or 
her case by clear and convincing evidence. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P. 2d 677, 682 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary 
elements by clear and convincing evidence."). Furthermore, a party seeking to take 
property through adverse possession based on parol gift must prove each element of that 
doctrine by clear and convincing evidence. Raleigh v. Wells, 81 P. 908, 910 (Utah 
1905). 
c. Legal Doctrines Altering Other Property Rights Demand Proof 
by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
In a similar vein, in those cases that involve invoking a legal doctrine to deprive a 
properly vested title holder of all, or some part, of his or her property interests, this Court, 
the Court of Appeals, and the Utah Legislature have demanded proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. Glauser Storage v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141,1119, 27 P. 3d 565, 
569 (clear and convincing evidence required to prove that a deed was actually intended as 
a mortgage and therefore entitled to be treated as such (equitable mortgage)); Swenson v. 
Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ^ 22, 998 P. 2d 807, 813 (clear and convincing evidence required 
to prove abandonment of a restrictive covenant); In re Ashton, 898 P. 2d 824, 826 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995) (clear and convincing evidence that at the time of forming a joint tenancy, 
there was no intent to create the right of survivorship required to overcome the 
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presumption in favor of joint tenancy with right of survivorship is valid); Davis v. Young, 
2008 UT App. 246, j^ 15, 190 P. 3d 23, 26 (clear and convincing evidence required for 
revocation of a trust that is not specifically stated to be revocable); Utah Code Ann. § 75-
6-104(1) (2009) (clear and convincing evidence required to prevent a surviving tenant in 
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship account from taking ownership of the whole 
account); Panos v. Olsen & Associates Const, 2005 UT App 446, \ 19, 123 P.3d 816, 
821 (clear and convincing evidence of mutual mistake required to avoid merger of a sales 
contract into a properly executed and delivered deed). 
d. Other Cases Involving Judicial Interference with Constitutionally 
Protected Interests Require Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
Interestingly enough, though perhaps not surprising in light of the Addington 
Court's analysis and this Court's analysis in Egbert, a review of the cases in which Utah 
courts require proof by clear and convincing evidence discloses that a significant majority 
of those cases involve the use of the judicial power to deprive a citizen of a 
constitutionally protected right or interest. See e. g., Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App. 
233, \ 29, 217 P. 3d 733 (civil contempt); In reA.F.K., 2009 Ut App. 233, ^  29, 216 P. 
3d 980 (clear and convincing evidence required to state case of prima facie child 
abandonment - right to raise and rear one's children (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57, 
66, 120S.Ct.2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000))); In re A. M, 2009 Ut App. 118^30, 208 p. 
3d 1058, 1065 (clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in 
child's best interest required before terminating parental rights). 
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In sum, a review of the situations in which civil courts demand proof by clear and 
convincing evidence discloses that this demanding evidentiary standard is "appropriate 
when the interests at stake in a civil case are particularly important and more substantial 
than the mere loss of money." Egbert, 2007 UT at [^13 (citing Addington, 441 U. S. at 
424) (internal quotations omitted). 
Mr. Kay respectfully submits that real property ownership is precisely the kind of 
"particularly important" interest that, when put at issue, triggers the demands of due 
process and requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is well established that 
real property is unique. For example, the unique character of real property is what makes 
an order of specific performance appropriate rather than the most common civil award, 
money damages. See Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 592 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1974) (affirming 
trial court's order of specific performance requiring defendant to execute and deliver a 
special warranty deed conveying the disputed real property to plaintiff). Because of this 
uniqueness, due process demands that a litigant who seeks to divest a citizen of fee title 
to real property based upon a claim of boundary by acquiescence must prove her case by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
e. Demanding Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence When Affecting 
a Judicial Taking of Real Property Rights Is Sound Public Policy. 
Finally, Mr. Kay submits that sound public policy also demands clear and 
convincing evidence in boundary by acquiescence cases. As discussed above, each year 
substantial public resources are devoted to recording, indexing, and platting documents of 
title in the offices of the county recorders of the state. Likewise, untold dollars and 
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resources are spent each year in the private sector to pay for surveys to pinpoint real 
property boundaries. The statutory requirements and infrastructure that enable the transfer 
of real property from one owner to another based upon written instruments are fully 
developed and well known. See U.C. A. §25-1-1 (Statute of Frauds); U.C. A. §57-1-1 et 
seq., (Conveyances); U.C. A. § 57-3-102, (Race-Notice); and U.C. A. § 17-21-1 etseq., 
(Recorder's Act). In contrast, boundary by acquiescence is an exception because it is a 
legal doctrine that re-aligns real property boundaries based on inferences drawn from the 
conduct of the parties, as opposed to properly executed and recorded documents of title. 
While there can be no question that the Doctrine fills an important gap in our law, there 
can also be no question that it is a mechanism for the transfer of real property that occurs 
outside the ordinary and usual system of conveying real property interests. 
This being the case, the wiser policy is to apply the doctrine restrictively, 
consistent with this Court's observation in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 
1990). Restrictive application of the doctrine enhances reliance on the established and 
conventional methods of real property conveyancing. In contrast, expanding the 
doctrine's application by requiring only proof by a preponderance of evidence would 
undermine society's reliance on properly executed and recorded documents of title. A 
key mechanism, if not the only means of ensuring a restrictive application of the doctrine, 
is a high burden of proof. Sound public policy therefore demands proof by clear and 
convincing evidence before a court may re-align deeded property boundaries set forth in 
properly executed and recorded written instruments through an application of the 
Doctrine. 
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In sum, our society places a high value on the right to own and protect real 
property. So substantial are these rights that they are protected by the United States 
Constitution, and are specifically guaranteed in the Utah Constitution. Furthermore, our 
society places considerable value in the ability to predictably and reliably determine real 
property boundaries through the records of the county recorders. Consistent with this 
high premium, courts routinely require the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in 
cases that involve divesting an owner of his or her real property interests. Similarly, in 
cases where courts infringe on constitutionally protected interests, they require proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Kay respectfully submits that for purposes of 
determining the burden of proof, there is no meaningful distinction between the doctrines 
cited above and the doctrine in this case: boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the 
burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
2. IN THE CONTEXT OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE, A PARTY 
ACQUIESCES WHEN HE OR SHE HAS THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT TO 
RECOGNIZE A VISIBLE LINE AS THE PROPERTY BOUNDARY. 
The elements of boundary by acquiescence are well settled. They are: 1) 
occupation; 2) up to a visible line; 3) mutual acquiescence in the line as the property 
boundary; 4) for a long time. Staker, 785 P. 2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). Three of the four 
elements are well established, and relatively uncomplicated in their application. 
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However, the acquiescence element remains anything but clear. Indeed, after an 
exhaustive review of the cases on this doctrine, the only thing that is clear is that the 
concept of acquiescence continues to be "the source of considerable confusion and 
controversy among judges, lawyers, and landowners in this state." Id. at 422. It appears 
that a significant reason for this persistent confusion is the lack of a workable definition 
of acquiescence. While this Court has laid the groundwork for a definition of 
acquiescence, it has yet to state a definition of what acquiescence means in this context. 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^ 19, 44 P. 3d 781, 788 ("to acquiesce, a landowner must 
recognize and treat an observable line . . . as the boundary dividing the owner's property 
from the adjacent landowner's property, regardless of whether the landowner knows 
where the actual boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain."). To this end, 
Appellant Kay respectfully submits that acquiescence in this context consists of the 
landowner's subjective intent to recognize a visible line as the property boundary. 
a. Occupation and Acquiescence Are Factually Distinct and Separate 
Legal Elements of the Doctrine. 
It is self-apparent that the occupation element and acquiescence elements are, in 
fact, separate requirements of the Doctrine, each of which must be separately proven in 
order for a claimant to prevail. However, in the reported cases, the line between the two 
elements is sometimes blurred because it has been stated that evidence of occupation up 
to a visible line can, under certain circumstances, be evidence of acquiescence. RHN 
2
 For example, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1988, defines 
"acquiescence" as a noun. It is the "act of acquiescing" or an "instance of acquiescing". 
Similarly, "acquiesce" is also a verb defined as "to accept or comply tacitly or passively." 
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Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ^ 25, 96 P. 3d 935. To muddy the waters further, 
sometimes mere occupation up to a line is not proof of acquiescence. Id. (citing Hales v. 
Frakes, 600 P. 2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979)). It is important however, to acknowledge that 
occupation and acquiescence are factually distinct and separate elements of the Doctrine. 
b. The Acquiescence Element Contemplates the Subjective Intent of the 
Landowner. 
In Ault, this Court stated that acquiescence is "[a] person's tacit or passive 
acceptance; implied consent to an act." Ault, 2002 UT at [^18 (citing Black's Law 
Dictionary 23 (7th ed. 1999)). From this definition, and as quoted above, this Court 
stated: 
to acquiesce, a landowner must recognize and treat an observable 
line . . . as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the 
adjacent landowner's property, regardless of whether the landowner 
knows where the actual boundary lies or whether the boundary is 
uncertain. 
Id. at \ 19. Lurking in the background of the constructs of an owner's "acceptance" and 
"recognition" is the issue of the landowner's subjective intent. That is, whether a 
landowner tacitly or passively accepts a line as a boundary, or impliedly consents to the 
same, turns on the subjective intent of the landowner. Thus, the occupation element and 
acquiescence element ask two separate questions: The occupation element asks if the 
landowner occupied up to a visible line; the acquiescence element asks the more 
important question, why he or she did so. 
The cases bear out this proposition. By way of illustration, acquiescence is 
defeated by a mere conversation between the adjoining landowners evidencing an 
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ongoing dispute or unwillingness to recognize the line as the boundary. Id. at If 21. 
Specifically, in Ault, this Court noted that negotiations had occurred between the parties 
concerning the potential of the plaintiff landowner purchasing the disputed property from 
the defendant landowner. Id. at \ 22. These negotiations evidenced that neither party 
intended to recognize the visible line as the boundary. Id. ("Indeed, evidence that the 
Holdens and the Aults discussed the possibility of the Holdens either purchasing or 
trading for the disputed parcels unequivocally shows that. . . neither tacitly consented to 
the fence as a boundary . . . . " ) . Thus, in Ault, it was evidence that demonstrated that 
neither party subjectively intended to recognize the fence as the boundary that defeated 
an application of the Doctrine. 
Another example is found in Staker, where this Court found that acquiescence had 
occurred based on the subjective intent of the parties. In Staker, one of the parties to the 
suit, the Shane family, had built a home, a part of which was located on the adjoining 
landowner's property, and not on the Shane property. Staker, 785 P. 2d at 421. The 
Shanes occupied this home for over eighty years without objection from the adjoining 
landowner. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that part of the Shane home was 
built on their property. Id. Relying on this fact, this Court concluded that the 
acquiescence element had been established. Id. While the Staker Court did not say so 
explicitly, its conclusion that acquiescence had occurred was based on the subjective 
intent of the parties. Because none of the adjoining landowners had objected to the 
location of the Shane home, but had instead occupied up to a fence line, the subjective 
intent of the landowners was clear. They intended to recognize the fence as the 
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boundary, as opposed to the deed line. 
In inferring acquiescence on the part of the adjacent landowner who claimed to the 
deed line, the obvious question was this: How could the adjacent landowner have 
thought that the deed line was the boundary if he allowed the Shane home to be built on 
his property? Stated otherwise, why would the adjacent owner allow someone else to 
build on his property? Because a reasonable landowner would not allow another to 
permanently occupy his land, the landowner must have had the subjective intent to 
recognize the fence as the boundary. Otherwise, he would have sought redress for the 
trespass. Accordingly, the landowner had acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. 
Other cases where this Court has sustained findings of no acquiescence are also 
instructive. For example, in Hales, this Court relied on facts that indicated that the true 
purpose of the fence was to control cattle, and as such, was not recognized as a boundary. 
Hales, 600 P.2d at 559. In that case, the Court cited to Holmes v. Judge, where the 
Court held that "where a fence or other monument which was claimed to mark a 
boundary is not actually intended to be a boundary, but is erected for some other purpose, 
the parties can claim to the true boundary line and there can be no boundary by 
acquiescence." Hales, 600 P.2d at 559 (citingHolmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1009, 1014 (Utah 
1906)). See also Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1954) (sustaining 
trial court's finding that the fence was not intended to be a boundary, but was intended to 
prevent sheep from damaging newly planted Box Elder trees.) More recently, this Court 
noted that acquiescence consists in the recognition of a line as the boundary. R. H. N. 
Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, \ 24 ("Acquiescence is a highly fact-dependent question, 
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. . . and acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from the evidence. . . .") 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Through these cases, this Court's analysis on acquiescence has revolved around 
the subjective intent of the parties, even though it may not have explicitly so stated. In 
light of these authorities, Mr. Kay respectfully submits that a property owner acquiesces 
in a visible line as the boundary when he or she has the subjective intent to recognize the 
visible line as the property boundary. 
3. WITHOUT MORE, MERE OCCUPATION DOES NOT PROVE 
ACQUIESCENCE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
As mentioned above, the occupation element and acquiescence element are 
distinct requirements of the Doctrine. Because these two elements are distinct from one 
another, there must be proof of each to re-align a boundary under the Doctrine. 
Accordingly, Mr. Kay respectfully submits that a case with proof of occupation only is 
insufficient to prove acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. 
a. Allowing Acquiescence Based Upon Mere Occupation Results in a 
Merging of the First Two Elements of the Doctrine into the Third. 
It is undisputed that this Court has stated that evidence of occupation up to a 
visible line is relevant on the question of acquiescence. See e. g., Staker, 785 P. 2d at 
420-21. However, this Court has also stated that evidence of mere occupation is not 
sufficient to establish acquiescence. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559. While this may appear 
to be a conflict, it is actually a reflection of the relevance standard under Rule 401 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The concept that appears to emerge from the cases is that 
depending on the circumstances of each case, evidence of occupation may be probative, 
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but is not determinative, on the issue of acquiescence. 
Evidence of mere occupation cannot be definitive proof of acquiescence by a 
landowner because under the Doctrine, the two elements are separate and distinct. And, 
it is clear that a plaintiff has the burden of proving all four elements of her claim. To 
hold otherwise would merge the first two elements of the Doctrine, occupation up to a 
visible line into the third, acquiescence in the line as a boundary. If this were the case, 
by proving mere occupancy, the acquiescence element would be satisfied. To prevail, all 
a plaintiff would have to do would be to prove, 1) occupancy up to a visible line, 2) by 
adjoining landowners, 3) for a long period of time. Such a holding would be a 
substantial departure from Hales, where this Court stated: 
Where there is no proof of acquiescence in the line as the 
boundary, there can be no boundary by acquiescence. And a 
failure to meet any one of the elements of the doctrine defeats 
the boundary. 
Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559 (emphasis in original). Importantly, under this strained analysis, 
the element that a plaintiff would no longer be required to prove would be the element 
that forms the very core of the doctrine: acquiescence. Furthermore, to allow the 
application of the Doctrine without separate proof of acquiescence would broaden the 
application of the Doctrine substantially by making the plaintiffs case much easier to 
prove. Needless to say, this would completely reverse the course of the jurisprudence in 
the Doctrine, which "has always been restrictively applied in Utah.v Staker, 785 P. 2d at 
423. 
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b. At a Minimum, Allowing Acquiescence Based Upon Mere 
Occupation Creates an Improper Presumption Against the Record 
Title Owner. 
An analysis that allows acquiescence to be inferred from the fact of mere 
occupation would effectively create an impermissible presumption against the record title 
owner that he or she has acquiesced. This is because upon a showing of occupation, the 
record title owner would be required to disprove acquiescence. As noted, such an 
analysis is inconsistent with this Court's statement in Hales which requires proof of each 
element of the Doctrine. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559. When placed into operation, 
inferring acquiescence from occupation only would incorrectly raise a presumption in 
favor of a plaintiff and against a defendant landowner that the defendant landowner has 
acquiesced in the line as the boundary. This is the case even though as noted, it is the 
defendant's rights that are afforded constitutional protection/ 
Also, to place a burden on a landowner to disprove intent to recognize the line as 
the boundary on a showing of occupation only is inconsistent with the demands of the 
Due Process Clause of the Utah and the United States Constitutions. Both clauses 
demand that a litigant who wishes to deprive a citizen of real property must bear the 
burden of proving each element of his case by clear and convincing evidence. Stated 
3
 This Court may have alluded to this burden-shifting in Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d at 789 
("Record property owners are not required to take legal action or otherwise "oust" 
someone adversely occupying their property to maintain legal rights in their property. 
They must only take some action manifesting that they do not acquiesce or recognize the 
particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the properties. ")(Internal citations and 
punctuation omitted). In view of the constitutional protections afforded real property 
interests, and the confusion within the Doctrine, Appellant respectfully suggests that any 
such burden shifting cannot be a correct statement of the law. 
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another way, the due process clauses of both constitutions demand that a court start with 
a presumption against the plaintiff. The plaintiff must then overcome this presumption 
by proving each element of his or her case by clear and convincing evidence. A 
defendant landowner, as the holder of a constitutionally protected real property interest 
should not be made to shoulder any such burden. The plaintiff, as the party seeking to 
deprive the defendant landowner of a constitutionally protected interest, must retain the 
burden. See Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559. 
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Kay's predecessors occupied to the fence. 
The critical question, however, is why they did so. The only fact in the record upon 
which the District Court relied in answering this question is the fact of mere occupation. 
That being the case, the record is devoid of evidence as to why Kay's predecessors 
occupied only to the fence. Accordingly and based upon the record before the trial court, 
the only way to conclude that Kay's predecessors subjectively intended to recognize the 
fence as the boundary is to infer their subjective intent to recognize the fence as the 
boundary from the fact of mere occupation. Considering the nature of the properly 
interest at stake, such an inference or presumption is improper under the Utah 
Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
4
 While the District Court cited Tom and Dale's opinion regarding the boundary, that 
evidence was not factual; it was lay opinion testimony, the sole foundation of which was 
their observation of occupation of the property up to the fence. Thus, the sole fact upon 
which the District Court's conclusion of acquiescence rests is the undisputed fact that 
both parties and their predecessors merely occupied up to the fence. 
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c. To Establish Acquiescence, More Than Mere Occupancy Is 
Required. 
The factual basis for finding intent, or the lack of intent, to recognize a line as a 
boundary will usually take the form of affirmative acts or statements from which intent, 
or lack thereof, may be inferred. Previously noted examples are found in Staker and 
Ault. Additionally, certain aspects of the law of easements are illustrative of how intent 
may be inferred from the acts of property owners. By analogy, these cases illustrate that 
more than mere occupancy must be required to prove intent to recognize a line as a 
boundary. 
As discussed in greater detail below, the law of abandonment of easements, in 
which the easements are based upon instruments of conveyance, is instructive in this case 
because the circumstances and considerations therein are highly analogous to the 
circumstances and considerations in boundary by acquiescence cases. Both involve the 
judicial divesture of a vested real property interest. The principal distinction between 
abandonment of easements and boundary by acquiescence is that boundary by 
acquiescence involves a divestiture of fee title, as opposed to the divestiture of a 
servitude as occurs in abandonment of easements. In both instances, the judicial power is 
employed to divest an owner of her real property interest based on the owner's conduct, 
as opposed to the more conventional means of conveyancing of real property interests 
through written recorded instruments. Both the law of abandonment of easements and 
boundary by acquiescence demand the clear and convincing standard because the 
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doctrmes attack the validity of written recorded instruments and deprive properly vested 
real property interest holders of their constitutionally protected property interests. 
Because abandonment of easements and boundary by acquiescence are 
conceptually so similar, the analytical structure this Court has established in 
abandonment of easements is helpful to an understanding of the factors to be taken into 
consideration before divesting an owner of fee title in boundary by acquiescence cases. 
Of particular importance in both cases is the inference of subjective intent based on the 
conduct of the owner of the real property interest. For example, if an owner of an 
easement blocks it or renders the easement unusable, or takes other actions consistent 
with the intent to abandon the easement, that can be evidence of an intent to abandon. 
Brown v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, 102 P. 740, 742 Utah 1909. There is no 
principled reason not to impose this same requirement when fee title is at issue by 
requiring courts to look to affirmative acts in boundary by acquiescence cases as the 
Court ofAppeals did in Argylev. Jones, 118 P. 3d 301, 305 (Utah App. 2005). If, for 
example, the fee owner allows the adjoining landowner to build a permanent structure on 
the fee owner's property without objection, as in Staker, that is evidence of intent to 
recognize the line as a boundary. This Court has previously hinted at such a rule, stating 
that merely allowing someone else to occupy your land is not sufficient to establish 
acquiescence in boundary cases. Hales, 600 P.2d at 599. 
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d. Evidence of Mere Occupation Fails To Satisfy The Cleai " and 
Convincing Standard Required in Boundary by Acquiescence 
Cases. 
>Mii>. . • •• .-.. • .;^ic OCK. upation to establish acquiescence would be inconsistent 
with the evidentiary rigor of the clear ,\v-A MP ;u > . > • in.i.n.- \ - >a .i.-d »!•.•• . . * n-
and coiwincing evidence is evidence that leaves the fact finder with no serious or 
substantial douhi • \- ^ ..... - • . i ••• * lear and Convincing Evidence. Mr.Kay 
respet i *\ - :> .-\ • I,MI .*.•( ^ r>r.M,« ,,..., \ jh- > , _ 
intent in occupying up to a visible line is the fact of mere occupation, serious and 
substantial doubt must necessarily remain. Real property rights are simply too important 
t o b e M« i i p a ! - •* - -• .t.ii d. 
Accordingly, Mr. Kay respectfully submits that a plaintiff in a boundary by 
acquiescence case has the burden to pro\e some factual basis from wlrich a subjective 
intent to recognize me ;iuc .is me iMiiniiary may be inferred, uther Unm me fact of mere 
occupation itself \\ : e n i , M ' » . M ! * - . •:.; ,U - : i ; K M , * 
acquiescence, if that is all a plaintiff IKLS lo otter, the plaintiffs case must fail as a matter 
of law. 
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THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAI,. 
Utah jurisprudence has a century-long history 011 abandonment of easements. A 
gooa example \ =-•:. . !\itrrv. Cayias. H i .^ i ••\XN I I i.ih 10(?, r AUKII involved a 
claim that an easement for an in igation pipelii le 1 lad beei 1 abandons d ' 1 1 le grai it of 
easement in Riter provided that the easement was a "perpetual right to construct, operate 
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and maintain a pipeline for irrigation purposes with the right of ingress and egress along 
said line." Id. at 789. In this regard, the perpetual grant in Riter is similar to the 
conveyance of fee title to Appellant Kay. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 615 
(1990) (Defining fee simple title as being "unlimited as to duration, disposition, and 
descendibility."). In Riter, the plaintiff claimed that the easement had been abandoned 
because the defendant had discontinued its use. Riter, 431 P. 2d at 789. In holding that 
there had not been an abandonment, this Court stated: 
This easement is a right in land evidenced by a written conveyance, 
duly recorded. The right so conveyed could be overcome only by 
clear and convincing evidence. And this must not be of mere non-use 
of the easement, but of the intention of the owner to abandon it. 
Id., internal citations omitted. 
A similar conclusion was reached by this Court ten years later in Western Gateway 
Storage v. Tresdeder, 567 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). Much like Appellant Kay's fee title in 
this case, in Western Gateway the right of way at issue had been acquired by a series of 
conveyances dating from 1909, all of which had been recorded. The plaintiff claimed 
that the right of way had been lost through non-use. In addressing that question, this 
Court stated: 
It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be 
abandoned. However, to determine the issue of abandonment 
several factors need be considered among which [is] . . . the 
actual intent of the owner. This court has previously recognized 
that a right gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use 
alone and that an actual intent to abandon [must] be evident. 
* * s|e 
In regard to the quantum of proof required on the issue of abandon-
ment, it [has been] determined that the degree of proof required [is] 
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that of clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and right 
of use and an intentional abandonment, not a mere preponderance of 
the evidence. 
. . *'- i l l ! , . . .• :i v i U i i i ' il - U H i l l l c d . 
Hence, Appellant respectfully subii)its lli.it Ihr .1,mil,ml .mil analysis adopted for 
the abandonment of easements in these cases, and as explained in the seminal case of 
Brown v Oregon Short Line K c ./ . io i /-KM I i.ih 1909), is instructive on the 
thereby divested of their fee title to the property. In Brown this Court stated: 
The mere nonuser of an easement created by deed, however long 
continued, is not of itself an abandonment of it, but at most, in 
connection with other facts, may be evidence of an intention to 
abandon or of actual abandonment. * * * An easement may be 
extinguished by an act of the owner of the easement which is 
incompatible with the existence of the right claimed. If the 
owner of the easement himself obstructs it in a maimer inconsistent 
with its further enjoyment, or permits the owner of the servient 
estate to do so. the easement -\ill be considered abandoned. 
Id. at 742, interr ..I * u.us.-n •• ,<. . ;.* • '••! . K,L 
Four fundamental considerations, ali ol which are consistent with Appellant's 
position in iIlls appeal, emerge from these abandonment cases and seem applicable to the 
m n ^ i i i ! 1 < •• , , i 5 !•• ,! i | u i v ^ v ^ n \ • • • • • . , iii^iv. l u j i i - i i ^ c 15 i n u J U I I H u :- : •- • • •. 
owner of the dominant estate of his easement. Consistently, Appellant respectfully 
submits that mere occupation of one's property by another is not sufficient to divest her 
Second, evidence of intent to abandon an easement is required. Appellant respectfi illy 
suggests that if evidence of intent is required to divest an easement owner of his 
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servitude, which by definition is a lesser interest than fee simple, the same degree of 
evidence should be required to divest an owner of fee title. Third, evidence of intent may 
be proven through affirmative acts, of either the owner of the dominant or the servient 
estate. In the context of boundary by acquiescence, this is consistent with the holdings in 
Stoker and the language in Argyle, which requires "affirmative acts" to prove an intent to 
recognize a line as the boundary. Fourth and finally, the burden of proof in abandonment 
of easement cases is clear and convincing. It is difficult to understand why, if clear and 
convincing evidence is required to divest an owner of a servitude, clear and convincing 
evidence would not also be required to divest an owner of fee title. Moreover, a clear 
and convincing standard is not only consistent with the law of abandonment of 
easements, it is consistent with a spectrum of cases and doctrines involving constitutional 
considerations, as noted above. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING KAY'S MOTION AND 
GRANTING EBF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The present appeal arises out of the Trial Court's decision granting EBF's motion 
for summary judgment and denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment. That 
being the case, the Trial Court was required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
EBF and against Kay for purposes of Kay's motion, and draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of Kay and against EBF for purposes of EBF's motion. To keep the analysis clear, 
the motions are addressed separately below. 
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a. EBF's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
For purposes of EBF's motion, this Court views the facts in the light most 
!•. v : i\,i\ a- . . . -!;..-• ^asoiiaoic mierences in nr> 
favor. Thurnwaldv. A.R, 2007 UT 38, H 5, 163 P.3d 623, 62:>. M i . - - .h.r-.h-, HI = V 
the allegation that his predecessors acquiesced in the fence as the boundary. I he 
remaining elements are undisputed. I hus, the narrow question posed here is whether the 
iintlispiiled l;u I1, in llu1 ivcoid and Ihe reasonable inferences io be drawn tlu'it Imni in 
favor of Kay, prove by clear and convincing evidence, that Kay's predecessors 
acquiesced in the fence as the boimdary and therefore, that EBF is entitled to judgment as 
i mallei' of law 
As the District Court noted, the only evidence from which acquiescence by Kay's 
predecessors could be inferred is the testimony of Tom and Dale Fowkes. R. 11 7. 
Simply put, Tom amJ • . . * me-ocu Kay's predecessors occupy the 
land up to, but not beyond the fence. Speuiicalh "H1 1 • - v!>iu w r<,<- ;w\ .-.I xv 
was their "understanding" of the location of the boundary based upon theii "experience 
with the property" ' K. 2 > \ lioth answered that tu^ed upon their experience with the 
j ) i \ ;j ; c i i y , LI K y i i t H n i >»u u u i 11 u n i n t - " " " >•>"••' " \ 
understanding was derived only from their observations of occupation up to the fence 
Kay again notes that Tom and Dale's "understanding" is a belief or an opinion. Kav 
submits that under these facts, Tom and Dales' beliefs are not evidence of the 
predecessors' intent if only because one person's "beliefs" are not evidence ot another's 
intent. And, even within the same individual a belief and intent are different. A belie! is 
an opinion that can be wrong while intent is a fact that may be proven with app'-opn'-ur 
evidence. 
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line. Both testified that there had never been any discussion, by any party, at any time, 
concerning a boundary, or the fence as a boundary. R. 226, 227-228, 297. There is no 
evidence that either had been directed or authorized by any Kay predecessor to take any 
action, or inaction, that would indicate that the fence was the boundary. Accordingly, 
this is the only testimony from any of Kay's predecessors or their families that supports 
the Trial Court's conclusion of acquiescence by Kay's predecessors in title. 
Hence, there is no evidence anywhere in the record that indicates that Kay's 
predecessors intended the fence to be the boundary. The only evidence is the testimony 
of Tom and Dale, who are not predecessors in Kay's title. Importantly and as noted, 
their testimony was based upon their "experience with the property." R. 234. That is, 
working the land and occupying only up to the fence line. Thus, the sole fact that comes 
to this case by way of Tom and Dale's testimony is the fact that Kay's predecessors 
occupied up to, but not beyond the fence. Stated otherwise, the evidence in this case 
shows occupation only. There is no other evidence from which to infer the subjective 
intent of Kay's predecessor's to recognize the fence as a boundary. 
i. When Construed Most Favorably Toward Kay and 
Against EBF, The Inference To Be Drawn From Mere 
Occupation Is That Kay's Predecessors Did Not 
Acquiesce. 
The fact of occupation can give rise to an inference of acquiescence. See Staker, 
785 P. 2d at 420-21. However, an inference of acquiescence does not necessarily follow 
from the fact of occupation. Indeed, there is Utah case law that suggests that mere 
occupation without more does not establish acquiescence. Hales, 600 P. 2d at 559 
Page 34 of 40 
("[P]laintiffs occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient to establish 
defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a b«niiular\ ") Therefore, viewing the evidence 
i -. ji-iu -no-t ia\ niiihu i.--\.i;, -li'.! '•: . w± M\ caMHiark inferences in im> iavui. 
entirely plausible that the subjective inteiit of Kay's predecessors was not to recc>gihze 
the fence as the boundary. The only feet that even suggests the intent of Kay's 
predecessors is the tact ot mere occupation. But under i .tali law, occupation may or may 
not si iggest acqi liescei ice. Ir i tl ic posti it e of EBF's i i lotion, it! le I )isti ict Coi n I: v 'as 
required to draw whatever inferences may be inferred from the facts in Kay's favor, ihat 
required the District Court to infer that mere occupation by Kay's predecessors did not 
S U g g C S t . 'C'.;-i*!H\ .r* :* ! ••!.•!»: . ; 
indicate that the intent of Kay's predecessors was to recognize the fence as the boundary. 
It was therefore error to conclude that EBF was enlillcd to judgment as a matter of law. 
ii. A G »u-i ence To Be Drawn ¥rorn Mere 
Occupation i^i.»v\s That Kay's Predecessors Did Not 
Acquiesce In 1 !u- !*>nce as a Boundary. 
In addition, a more plausible explanation exists as to why Kay's predecessors 
occupied only up to the fence. The mere occupation to whicu !'nm and I >ale testified 
' i . •• , • , . . . , r i i . . , . , i 1; . . . . i . , , , . , : , — ~ n 
V^  . . , . . H I , i H i >* i i i m • u i i 11 i M . •» . . •• i •» i
 ( n , i i i i . .. • > i s i • i - • •. « M r \ * i i ' C I 1 C ' C 
inconvenience, lack of resources to move the fence or, ni view of the nature of the 
agricultural use of the laud and lis relatively small size, a cost-benefit analysis indicating 
tl tat i elocating tl le fei ice was i lot ^ \ ortl i tl ic .tii i i : ai id : f fc i t Ii I ' ie , * ' of tl i s I i lii lin lal 
amount of land involved, and the agricultural use of the same, Kay's predecessors may 
have concluded that moving the fence was ilot worth the expense under the 
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circumstances. None of these alternative reasons suggest that the predecessors intended 
the fence to be the boundary. Indeed, based upon a cost/benefit analysis, the expense of 
relocating 2700 feet offence may not have been worth the benefit to Kay's predecessors' 
cattle and farming operations in obtaining only a maximum of 130 feet. In the posture of 
Kay's motion, the District Court was required to construe this fact and the inference 
drawn therefrom in favor of Kay. When this is done, the reasonable inference drawn 
from this undisputed fact shows that Kay's predecessors' occupation up to the fence was 
not a consequence of their intent to recognize the fence as a boundary, but rather that 
there was no meaningful benefit in doing otherwise. That being the case, the district 
court erred by not drawing this inference in Kay's favor, and therefore erred in ruling that 
EBF was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
In the purest sense of the word, perhaps these alternative inferences of convenience, 
inconvenience, lack of resources, etc., derived from the fact of mere occupation suggest 
"acquiescence" based upon inaction. This is why a workable definition thai focuses on 
the intent of the landowner would be helpful in reducing the confusion in the Doctrine. 
Each of the above alternative inferences to be drawn from mere occupation might suggest 
that, through inaction, an owner has "abandoned" her real properly interest. However, 
ownership of fee title cannot be abandoned. Cristofani v. Board of Education of Prince 
Georges County, 632 A. 2d 447 (Md. App. 1993). As explained in Turk v. Wilson's 
Heirs, 98 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. App. 1936), 
By virtue of section 470, Ky. Stats (the statute of frauds), there is but one 
way for a man to part with a vested title to real estate, and that is by a writing 
signed by him. A vested fee-simple title to real estate cannot be abandoned. 
If a man should go away and leave it for forty, fifty, or any other number of 
years, and no one should seize and occupy the property adversely, or should 
it not be sold for taxes, the returning owner would perhaps find his property 
grown up with saplings and bushes, but he would find his title unimpaired. 
This is consistent with Utah's Statute of Frauds, U.C.A. § 25-1-1 et seq. 
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b. Kay's Motion for Sumiuat \ T igment. 
Mr. Kay's motion is subject to the same requirement that the District Court view 
t
 :i . IKIK- i • • \ -' • a !a\ IM ti ... . .ii.ii'!''- .- :. .,\ .a: reuMMianic imerences 
in favor of EBF. Id, 1hat being the case, for pi irposes of Appellant's motioi1, the Trial 
Court was required to infer that occupation is, on some level, evidence of acquiescence. 
i. rliK h. 1 o lii Ui A** n 1 f oiu Mere Occupation Is 
f i and <^ >if:tlif\ of I \ irience Necessary to 
For purposes of Kay's motion, the only evidence of acquiescence is the inference 
drawn from the fact of mere occupation. That is, in the posture of Kay's motion for 
si n i i! riai y ji idgi i lent , tl t s I i Iail ( 'c i n t * vra,i ;; i eqi iii e d to ii lie: i tl lat tl: le fact of n lere occi lpatioi i 
by Kay's predecessors indicated, on some level, that they subjectively intended to 
recognize the fence as a boundary. The dispositive question on this motion is whether 
tin-. aiiLMc inference, oascu upi':. MIOIC occiipai :-.MI -UH\, . is ;-i me quantum aiui quality of 
evidence that justifies a taking of a real nmrvr!* i! : • ' T » * • » ; , • *' : i i -»
 ; ,' 
United States Constitutions. Put another w i \ : Does the inference of acquiescence the 
Trial Coiirt was required to draw from this evidence satisfy the clear and convincing 
again in yet another form: Does this inference give the fact finder the degree of 
confidence in concluding that Kay's predecessors acquiesced in the fence as a boundary; 
tl lat 3i it societ; ; 1:1 linl cs it si IC i lid 1 lave before a coi n t di/v ests a pi opei ty o vv i ler of 1 lis 
constitutionally protected fee title? 
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The answer to these questions is "no". This is because the inference drawn from 
mere occupation is simply too tenuous and inconclusive to be clear and convincing. 
While mere occupation may suggest acquiescence, it does not compel the mind to 
conclude that Kay's predecessors occupied up to the fence because they intended it to be 
the boundary. As stated above, the clear and convincing standard requires a plaintiff to 
prove his or her case to the point that no serious or substantial doubt remains regarding 
the truth of his or her assertions. See MUJI 2d CV118 Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
As stated in Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949): 
That proof is convincing which carries with it, not only the power to 
persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact 
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or 
correctness. Clear and convincing evidence clinches what might be 
otherwise only probable to the mind. 
While the fact that Kay's predecessors occupied only to the fence may suggest or 
"make probable to the mind" that they intended to recognize the fence as a boundary, the 
dispositive question is this: Does the fact that Kay's predecessors occupied up to the 
fence "clinch" in the mind that the predecessors had the subjective intended to recognize 
the fence as a boundary? The answer to this question is also "no". In view of its tenuous 
and inconclusive nature, the inference drawn from mere occupation is not the quality or 
quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the clear and convincing standard or that will 
pass constitutional muster. 
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ii. As a Matter of Law, Mere < h* upation Cannot Establish the 
Acqueiscence Elemeni Because Such \n \ utlv sis W ouhf 
Merge Two Elements of the Doctrine of Boundary By 
Acqiliescence ' n i t i Ov*\ 
Also, as a i i latter of law , i t let e occi ipation i ip to a fei ice does not establish 
acquiescence. iC[T]he plaintiffs occupation up to the fence without interference was not 
sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as the boundary." Hales, 
600 1 • 2d at 559 Gh >m 11 - H 'hitney \ 209 P 2d 257. 260 ("I li; il :t II9 ! 9) ( ''Ill"I ]I le • I i i c r e f« tct 
that a fence happens to be put up and neither parlv does anythiim about it for a long 
period of time will not establish it as the true boundaiy. ) li was therefore error for the 
1i ial Coiirt to coikiuk: mm mere occupation estak: .ik-.i acquiescence as a manor oi law. 
This is because if a court was to hold that evidence of mere i\ , up.ii . •.•. • 
acquiescence, as a matter of law, the first element (occupation) and second element (up to 
a visible line) of the Doctrine would he merged into the unrd (.acquiescence). As noted 
ab<iX < • • ' ' ' •' ' ! . - . >
 ; , i . i i i . • » f 
boundary by acquiescence and results in the omission of proof of the most important 
element of all: acquiescence. 
v o >. LUSION 
In light of the importance of real property rights in our society, serious or 
substantial doiibt remains as to whether Kay's predecessors acquiesced in the fence as a 
1 • -i \i • •••:*'';:•' •• • \ e - u u Mii'ge^ ii ig acquiescence, even the 
most favorable inference of acquiescence drawn from these facts leaves ample room 'or 
alternative explanations thereby rendering it insufficient to satisfy the clear and 
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convincing standard. The evidence in this case is not the quantum and quality of 
evidence courts should require for a taking of fee title to real property. Real property 
rights are constitutionally protected and should not be so lightly disregarded. The clear 
and convincing standard is simply too high to be overcome by so little evidence. A 
litigant who wishes to take a constitutionally protected interest from another under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence must present something in addition to the mere 
occupation shown in this case in order to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence 
standard. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in granting EBF's motion for summary 
judgment and in denying Mr.Kay's motion for summary judgment. This Court should 
reverse that judgment and order summary judgment be entered in favor of Mr. Kay and 
against Appellee. 
DATED this /O day of March, 2010. 
Respectfully submitted, 
4<V>Ut 
GERMAN C. YOUNG 
Attorney for Appellant StevenL. Kay 
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IVIE & YOUNG 
226 West 2230 N= ••;•!!! 
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Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
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CERTIFICATE 
OF 
HAND 
DELIVERY 
*
 ll
 * 
Defendant ana Appellant. Trial Court No. 20090922 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I ?ih da\ of March. 2010. I caused u> be sen ed b\ hand 
delivery two (2) true and correct copies of .... .. K : • ? •' I 
the Joih- i \ i r ; ' ' : 
H. Burt Ringwood 
STRONG &HANNI 
3 Triad Center 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Essential Botanical Farms, LC 
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SHERMAN C. YOI 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT B 
WARRANTY DEED 
U U L 0 J 0 1 7 6k 0466 pg m \ 
CRAIG J . SPERRY, JUAB COUNTY RECORDER 
2004 JUN 30 13:46 PH FEE $11.00 8V SIC 
FOR: JUAB TITLE t ABSTRACT COttPAHY 
DARYL H. STANLEY and OLIVE F. STANLEY, as Trustees of the STANLEY FAMILY 
TRUST U/A/D May 8, 1995, Grantors, of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to STEVEN L. 
KAY, Grantee, of 150 North Draper Lane, Provo, UT 84601-2350 for the sum of Ten Dollars 
($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in Juab County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
Parcel No, XB-1433-1: Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, thence South 160 rods to the Southeast corner of the North half of the 
Southwest quarter of said Section 4, thence West 50,25 rods to a point 51.2 rods 
East of the East boundary of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 91, thence North 100 
rods to a point on the East boundary of the right-of-way of said U.S. Highway 91, 
thence Northerly on said East boundary of said highway to a point due West of the 
point of beginning, thence East 24.57 rods, more or less, to the point of beginning. 
Together with all improvements thereon and anywise appertaining thereto. 
Subject to easements, rights, restrictions, rights-of-way, conditions, covenants, reservations, 
currently of record or enforceable in law or equity and subject to current general property taxes. 
WITNESS THE HANDS of said Grantors this 23rd day of June, A.D. 2004. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF JUAB 
: ss. 
) 
On the 23rd day of June, A.D. 2004, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as Trustees of the Stanley Family Trust U/A/D 
May 8, 1995, the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
same pursuant to and in accordance with powers vested in them by the terms of said trust agreement. 
/ < ^ \ 
- - ^ 8 ^ . 
MARY LOU SPERRY 
KrmY PUBLIC'SmoHJTfM 
\\:>?&i f') (& S 400 N. • POB 246 
W / V ^ y ; V NEPHi, UTAH 84648 
X < ^ C0MM. EXP, 6-15-2006 
^S 
JUAB TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY 
wwwjuabtitle.com 
240 North Main P. O. Box 246 Nephi, Utah 84648 
(435) 623-0387 Order No. 22693. 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT C 
HM7, ltfr)\ 
R. DELOS ANDREWS and MAX1NE D. ANDREWS, ELDON VERNESS ANDREWS and 
ELIZABETH G. ANDREWS, NELDON V. ANDREWS also known as NELDON ANDREWS and 
ANNA LEE ANDREWS and ORAL CALVERT TAYLOR and LA VEDA ANDREWS TAYLOR also 
known as LAVEDA A. TAYLOR, MORGAN V. ANDREWS and JANET ANDREWS, SHIRLEY 
PITTS and RICHARD PITTS, Grantors, of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT against all 
claiming by, through or under Grantors, but not otherwise to ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, 
a Utah limited liability company, Grantee, of 250 South Main, Payson, Utah 84651 for the sum of 
Ten Dollars ($10 00) and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tracts of land 
in Juab County, State of Utah, to-wit 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. 
For the consideration recited above, Grantors hereby convey and assign to Grantee, without 
warranties of title, all water rights, claims, applications and shares appurtenant to or used to provide 
water for use on the foregoing lands, whether approved or unapproved, and whether evidenced by 
certificates of appropriation, applications for appropriation, water user's claims, decrees, orders, permits, 
contracts, leases, change applications, exchange applications, or shares in water or irrigation companies, 
and together with all easements, ditches, canals, facilities, wells, pumps, pipelines and other equipment 
used for the development or use of the same, including, without limitation, the water rights described in 
Exhibit "B" attached hereto and made a part hereof 
WITNESS THE HANDS of said Grantors this J2ih day of March, A D 1998 
R Delos Andrews 
Maxine D Andrews 
Eidon Verness Andrews 
Oral Calvert Taylor ^ 
4rz2_ 
Elizabeth G. Andrews 
Laveda Andrews Taylor also known^s 
Laveda A Taylor 
Morgan *V Andrews 
anet/Andrews ^~. 
Neldon V Andrews also known as Neldon Andrews Smrley Pitts
 w 
Anna Lee Andrews Richard Puts 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF JUAB 
ss 
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1993 MAR 13 i i9:71 AH FEE « n . i ' t i p) DrZ 
FOR: JUAC TTTLE t ABSTRACl iQMFANr 
) 
On the 12th day of March, A D 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, R DELOS ANDREWS and MAXINE D ANDREWS, ELDON VERNESS 
ANDREWS and ELIZABETH G ANDREWS, NELDON V ANDREWS also known as NELDON 
ANDREWS and ANNA LEE ANDREWS and ORAL CALVERT TAYLOR and LAVEDA ANDREWS 
TAYLOR also known as LAVEDA A TAYLOR, MORGAN V ANDREWS and JANET ANDREWS, 
SHIRLEY PITTS and RICHARD PITTS, the signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Pi/Slic 
JUAB TITLE & AHSTRACI COMPANY 
240 North Mam I\ O. Box 246 Ncphi, Utah 84648 
(80!) 623-0387 Order No. 14691. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel XB 1421-1: 
Parcel XB 1428-21: 
Parcel XB 1428-32: 
Parcel XB 1428-41: 
Parcel XB 1428-61: 
Parcel XB 1458-1: 
Parcel XB 1458-31: 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Southeast quarter of Section 33, Township 10 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State 
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Southeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State 
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: The North half of the Northeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State 
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: The North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East', Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State 
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: The South half of the Northeast quarter of Section 4, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State 
Road Commission in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
Beginning where old U.S. Highway 91 crosses the South line of the Northeast quarter 
of Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 4000 
feet, more or less, to (he East line of reservoir, thence North 18°03' East 73.7 feet, 
thence North 12°38' East 122.9 feet, thence North 33°11' West 104.3 feet, thence North 
14°31' East 100 feet, thence North 82°36' East 158.8 feet, thence South 68°04' East 119 
feet, thence North 38° 12; East 50 feet, thence North 68°27' Wes! 122 feet, thence North 
21°27' West 150.5 feel, thence North 7° 12' East 170 feet, thence North 50°48' East 78 
feet, thence North 88°50' East 179 feet, thence North 80°2r East 255.9 feet, thence 
South 86°21' East 73.6 feet, thence North 41°44' East 101.9 feet, thence South 66°29' 
East 72.4 feet, thence South 87°57' East 108.8 feet, thence North 02°31' West 88.6 feet, 
thence North 36°05' East 158.5 feet, thence North 57°4T East 117 feet, thence North 
24°34' East 171.9 feet, thence North 54°06' West 60.9 feet, thence North 18°37' East 
114 feet, thence North 0°27' East 202 feet, thence North 2°00' East 228.8 feet, thence 
North 59°15' West 215.6 feet, thence North 49°41' West 200.7 feet, thence North 
81°08' West 123.2 feet, thence South 76°20' West 186.9 feet, thence South 63°55' West 
266 feet, thence South 74°14' West 121.9 feet, thence North 77°53' West 173 feet, 
thence South 79°31' West 278.8 feet, thence North 38°29' West 120.8 feet, thence North 
4 0 21 ' East 168.6 feet, thence North 42°20' East 222.4 feet, thence North 2° 14' East 
263.5 feet to the North boundary of Section 8, thence South 89°52/ East 317 feet, thence 
South 63°34' East 150.1 feet, thence North 78° 19' East 398 feet, thence|East 1232.4 
feet, thence South 40 rods, thence East 160 rods, more or less, to the West side of old 
U.S. Highway 91, thence Southwesterly along said highway to the place of beginning. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 60 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9, 
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence 
South 60 rods, thence West 325 rods, more or less, to the East side of State Highway, 
thence Northeasterly along the East side of said Slate Highway 63 rods, more or less, to 
a point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 5 rods, more or les.s, to the place 
of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township II South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Continuation of EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel XB 1458-22: 
Parcel XB 1458-41: 
Parcel XB 1463: 
Parcel XB 1463-21: 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 652.5 feet South of the Northwest corner of Section 9, 
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 65.2 feet, thence 
North 22°30' East 706.3 feet to the North boundary line of said Section 9, thence East 
4944.5 feet to the Northeast corner of said Section 9, thence South 60 rods, thence West 
325 rods, more or less, to the East side of old U.S. Highway 91, thence Northeasterly 
along the East side of said highway to the place of beginning. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 120 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9, 
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence 
South 60 rods, thence West 345 rods, more or less, to the East side of the State 
Highway, thence Northeasterly along the East side of said State Highway 63 rods, more 
or less, to a point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 25 rods, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian. Less access roads conveyed to Utah State Road Commission 
in Book 267, Page 431, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 1104 feet, 
thence North 52°51' East 98 feet, thence North 48°24' West 186 feet, thence North 
2°50' East 100 feet, thence North 49°07' East 400 feet, thence North 11°17' East 300 
feet, thence North 60°04' East 186 feet, thence North 26°06' East 270 feet, thence North 
1°27' East 194 feet, thence East 520 feet, thence South 1320 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Also the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, the Northwest quarter of the 
Southeast quarter and that part of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, which lies West of old 
U.S. Highway 91. excepting the part thereof deeded to the Railroad in Book H, Page 
372, in Book 10, Page 233, in Book 79, Page 510 and in Book 99, Page 32, of the 
records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described property lying West of the West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to-wit: Beginning 180 rods South of the Northwest corner of Section 9, 
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 320 rods, thence 
South 60 rods, thence West 365 rods, more or less, to the East side of State Highway, 
thence Northeasterly along the East side of said Highway 63 rods, more or less, to a 
point due West of the place of beginning, thence East 45 rods, more or less, to the place 
of beginning. Includes parcel in Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian. 
Parcel XB 1466-1: 
Parcel XB 1468-11: 
Beginning at a point where the West boundary of the State Highway intersects the South 
boundary of Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence 
Northeasterly along the West boundary of said State Highway to the point of intersection 
with the North boundary of the South half of the Southeast quarter of said Section 8, 
thence West 175 rods, more or less, to the Northwest corner of the Southeast quarter of 
the Southwest quarter of said Section 8, thence South 390 feet to the East side of the 
Railroad right-of-way, thence Southwesterly along the right-of-way to the South boundary 
line of said Section 8, thence East 175 rods, more or less, to the place of beginning. 
Less 0.41 acre, more or less, conveyed to Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, 
in Book 307, Page 621, of the records of Juab County, Utah. 
That portion of the following described properly lying West of (he West line of 1-15 
Freeway, to -vit: The South half of (he South half of Section 9, Township 11 South, 
Continuation of EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel XB 1484: Beginning at the Northeast comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 62 rods, more or less, to the 
County Road, thence Southerly along the West side of County Road 40 rods, more or, 
less, to the intersection of said road with the South line of the North half of the 
Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 17, thence West 125 rods, 
more or less, along said line to its intersection with the East line of the Northwest quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 17, thence West 1320 feet to the West line of 
said Section 17, thence North 40 rods along said Section line to the Northwest comer of 
said Section 17, thence East 160 rods to the place of beginning. 
Also that part of the following described tract which lies in the North half of the 
Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, to-wit: Beginning at the Southeast comer of the Northeast 
quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 18, thence West 892 feet, thence North 
51°08' West 170 feet, thence North 21°55' East 345 feet, thence South 87°55' East 83 
feet, thence North 15°30' East 205 feet, thence North 18°30' East 269 feet, thence North 
28°12' East 435 feet, thence North 76°22' East 59 feet, thence South 73°38' East 335 
feet, thence North 81°02' East 104 feet, thence North 58°06' West 251 feet to a point 
on Section line between Sections 7 and 18, 204 feet West of the Southeast comer of 
Section 7, thence East 204 feet to the Northeast corner of said Section 18, thence South 
1320 feet to the place of beginning. 
Parcel XB 1485: The South half of the North half of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Also beginning at the Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter 
of said Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 
40 rods, thence East 45 rods, more or less, to the West side of County Road, thence 
Southwesterly 41 rods, more or less, along the West side of County Road to a point on 
the South line of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 17, 
thence West 38 rods to the place of beginning. 
Also that part of the following described tact which lies in the South half of the Northeast 
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, to-wit: Beginning at the Southeast comer of the Northeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of said Section 18, thence West 892 feet, thence North 51°08' West 
170 feet, thence North 21 °55' East 345 feet, thence South 87°55' East 83 feet, thence 
North 15°30' East 205 feet, thence North 18°30' East 269 feet, thence North 28° 12' 
East 435 feet, thence North 76°22' East 59 feet, thence South 73°38' East 335 feet, 
tlience North 81°02' East 104 feet, thence North 58°06' West 251 feet to a point on 
Section line between Sections 7 and 18, 204 feet West of the Southeast comer of said 
Section 7, tlience East 204 feet to the Northeast comer of said Section 18, thence South 
1320 feet to the place of beginning. 
Parcel XB 1486: Beginning at the Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 30 rods, thence East 80 rods, 
tlience South 30 rods, thence West 80 rods to the place of beginning. 
Also beginning 60 rods West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South. Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence North 1.5 rods, (hence West 99 rods, thence North 45 rods, thence West 1 rod, 
thence South 46.5 rods, thence East 100 rods to the place of beginning. 
ft »n n t! n»» P>C\ \ 
Continuation of EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel XB 1487- Beginning 30 rods North or the Southwest corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, 
Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 50 rods, thence 
East 80 rods, thence South 50 rods, thence West SO rods to the place of beginning 
Excepting and excluding the following, to-wit Beginning at a point 50 rods North and 
6 rods West from the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter 
of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 11 
rods, thence West 14 rods, thence South 11 rods, thence East 14 rods to the place of 
beginning 
Parcel XB 1488 
Parcel XB 1489 
Beginning at a point 50 rods North and 6 rods West from the Southeast corner of the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 11 rods, thence West 14 rods, thence South 11 
rods, thence East 14 rods to the place of beginning 
Beginning 48 5 rods West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 17, Township 11 South, Range 1 Cast, Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence West 11 5 rods, thence North 1 5 rods, thence West 99 rods, thence North 45 
rods, thence West 1 rod, thence North 33 5 rods, thence East 1315 rods, more or \essy 
to the West side of the highway, thence Southerly along the West side of said highway 
to the place of beginning 
Parcel XB 1491 The Northwest quarter at the Southwest quarter ot Section 17, Township 11 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian 
Parcel XB 1513 Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 7, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, thence West 204 feet, thence North 58°57' West 140 feet, thence North 
37°20' West 256 feet, thence North 43°40' East 304 feet, thence North 5°00' East 193 
feet, thence North 48°27' East 109 feet, thence North 29°00' East 341 feet to the East 
line ol said Section 7, thence North 63°46' East 203 feet, thence North 52°51' East 47 
feet, thence East 1104 feet on the North line of the Southwest quarter of the Southwest 
quarter ol Section 8, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence 
South 390 feet on the East line of said Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of said 
Section 8 to the railroad right of way, thence Southwesterly along said right of-way to 
a point on the South line of said Section 8, thence West along said Section 8 line to the 
place of beginning 
Parcel XB 1514 Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northeast quarter of Section 18, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 1196 feet, thence North 38°08' 
West 95 feet, thence North H°Q6' East 172 feet, thence North 24°37r East 306 feet, 
thence North 7°38/ West 547 feet, thence North 67°28' East 243 feet, thence North 
19°42' East 175 feet, thence North 51 °08' West 20 feet, thence East S99 feet to the East 
line of said quarter Section, thence South 1320 feet to the place of beginning 
-o o 0-0-
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EXHIBIT E 
Water Rignts ana Applications 
1. 174 Shares of Norm Canyon Water. 
2. Water Right No. 53-66. Appiicanon No. A21443, Certificate No. 5457, 
for 6.0 cfs from underground water well; Priority: March 14, 1950. 
3. Water Right No. 53-67. Appiicanon No. A21444T Certificate No. 6878, 
for 6.0 cfs from underground water well; Priority: March 14, 1950. 
4. Water Right No. 53-288. Appiicanon,No. U10637, for .045 cfs from 
underground water well. 
5. Water Right No. 53-289. Appiicanon No. U10638, for .045 cfs from 
underground water weii. 
6. Water Right No. 53-290. Application No. U10639, for .668 cfs from 
underground water well. 
7. Water Right No. 53-291, Application No. U10640, for .0011 cfs from 
underground water well. 
8. Water Right No. 53-292. Appiicanon No. U10641, for .045 cfs from 
underground water well. 
9. Water Right No. 53-293, Application No. U10642, for 2.228 cfs from 
underground water well. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT D 
IVIH! | 4 £.uuu 
O V A l r' ? P I N T H E F 0 U R T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
aYUL^v.. J U A B C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTA$g |-.:.v | ;, f ;•; 0* 
ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RULING AND ORDER ON CROSS 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT 
STEVEN L. KAY'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
STEVEN L KAY, an individual; JOHN DOES 
AND ENTITIES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
STEVEN L. KAY, an individual, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiff, 
v. 
ESSENTIAL BOTANICAL FARMS, LC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Counterclaim-Defendant. 
Civil No. 050600068 
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Essential Botanical Farms ("EBF") and Steven L. Kay filed cross motions for partial 
summary judgment m a real property boundary dispute. 
EBF filed a motion for paitial summary judgment with a supporting memorandum on 
September 17, 2007 (ctEBF First SJ Mem."). On October 22, 2007, Kay filed a motion to strike 
Paragraphs 17 and 25 of EBF's Statement of Undisputed and Material Facts (located in EBF First 
Mem. at iii-xix) with a supporting memorandum ("Kay Strike Mem."). On October 25, 2007, Kay 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a memorandum serving to both support his cross-
motion and to respond to EBF's motion (titled Defendant Steven L. Kay's Combined Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's 
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Kay First S J Mem.")). On November 28, 2007, EBF 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("EBF Second 
SJ Mem.") along with a memorandum in opposition to Kay's motion to strike ("EBF Mem. Opp'n 
to Strike"). Kay filed reply memoranda in support of his cross-motion for paitial summary judgment 
1 
and motion to strike on January 4, 2008 ("Kay Second SJ Mem." and "Kay Reply Strike Mem."). 
The Court received oral arguments on the motions on March 13,200 8. See Docket. Having reviewed 
and carefully considered the evidence and arguments submitted by counsel, the Court makes the 
following ruling and order. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Parties' Properties and Location of the Original Fence 
1. This case involves property located in Section 4, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 4"), located in the Mona Valley, near Mona, Utah. (Affidavit 
of Steven L. Kay ["Kay Affidavit"], at 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 5 1fl[ 1-2; EBF Second SJ Mem. at 
in.) 
2. EBF holds fee-title ownership in certain real property (the "EBF Property") in Section 
4. (EBF First SJ Mem. at iv ^ | 3 (citing Special Warranty Deed recorded by the Juab County Recorder 
on March 13, 1998, as Entry No. 00212715, in Book 0391, at Page 0181); Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 
(not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiffs Statement of Facts); id. at 5 ^ 1; EBF Second SJ Mem 
at iii (not disputing Paragraph 1 of Kay's Statement of Additional Uncontested and Material Facts).) 
3. Kay owns certain real property (the "Kay Property") immediately adjacent to, and 
located west of, the EBF Property. (EBF First SJ Mem. at iv |^ 4 (citing Warranty Deed recorded by 
the Juab County Recorder on June 20, 2004, as Entry No. 00235619, in Book 0466, at Page 0641); 
id. at 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3; Answer and Counterclaim at 5 \ 29 (stating EBF "owns propeity 
immediately adjacent to Kay's propeity"); Reply to Counterclaim at 2 \ 29 ("EBF admits that it owns 
property immediately adjacent to property purportedly owned by Kay.")) 
4. The parties agree that the location of the original fence at issue in this action (the 
"Original Fence") is reflected on a survey prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying, 
signed on August 9,2004 (the "Survey"), and which is attached to EBF's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as Exhibit "A." See Affidavit of Stephen L. Ludlow (filed 
Sept. 17,2007); EBF First SJ Mem. at iii \ 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 
of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts). The parties agree the Survey accurately reflects the locations of 
fence lines that existed on the various properties at the time the Survey was conducted. Ludlow Aff. 
f^4; EBF First SJ Mem. at iii \ 2; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of 
Plaintiffs Statement of Facts). 
B. The Partiesf Predecessors in Interest 
1 The FoM>kes Family—Kay's Predecessors in Interest1 
5. The official records of Juab County, Utah, reflect that Kay's predecessors in interest 
in the Kay Property include the following: 
(a) The Kay Property was conveyed by Thomas G. Fowkes and Lela Fowkes to 
John L. Fowkes on or about March 27, 1937. At that point in time, the Kay Propeity included an 
adjoining, triangular parcel of property that is now known as Parcel No. XB1433-21. EBF First SJ 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, the source of the material in Paragraph 5 and its subsections is EBF First SJ Mem. 
at iv-v % 5. See also Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts). 
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Mem. at iv f 5(a) (citing copy of Deed conveying the Kay Property to John L. Fowkes attached 
thereto as Exhibit "D")-
(b) Pursuant to the Order Approving First and Final Account and Decree of 
Distribution recorded on or about November 23, 1959, the Kay Property was conveyed by L. Earl 
Fowkes, the administrator of the Estate of John L. Fowkes, to Maud Fowkes, who was the wife of 
John L. Fowkes. EBF First SJ Mem. at iv f 5(b) (citing copy of Decree of Distribution attached 
thereto as Exhibit "E"). 
(c) The Kay Property was later conveyed by Maud Fowkes to Blanch F. Cloward 
(a daughter of John and Maud Fowkes) pursuant to a Declaration and Deed of Trust. EBF First SJ 
Mem. at v Tf 5(c) (citing copy of Declaration and Deed of Trust attached thereto as Exhibit tcF"). As 
reflected on the Declaration and Deed of Trust, John L. Fowkes died on December 14, 1957. See 
also EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv K 1 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto 
as Exhibit "A"). Maud Fowkes died on July 9,1965. EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv ^  2 (citing Affidavit 
of Karen W. Smith, dated Nov. 26, 2007, attached thereto as Exhibit "B")-
(d) On February 24,1970, a Deed of Conveyance was recorded to convey the Kay 
Property from Blanch F. Cloward to her sister Olive F. Stanley and Olive's husband, Daryl H. 
Stanley. The Deed of Conveyance to the Stanleys did not include the adjoining, triangular parcel to 
the west, which is now known as XB1433-21. EBF First SJ Mem. at v ^ 5(d) (citing copy of Deed 
of Conveyance attached thereto as Exhibit "G")- Blanche F. Cloward died on October 9,1990. EBF 
Second SJ Mem. at iv |^ 3 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto as Exhibit 
"C")-
(e) On May 22, 1995, the Kay Property was conveyed by Olive F. Stanley and 
Daryl H. Stanley to Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as trustees of the Stanley Family Trust, 
u/a/d May 8, 1995. EBF First SJ Mem. at v TJ 5(e) (citing copy of Warranty Deed attached thereto 
as Exhibit "H"). 
(f) On June 30, 2004, Olive F. Stanley and Daryl H. Stanley, as trustees of the 
Stanley Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995, conveyed the Kay Property to Kay pursuant to the 
Warranty Deed described in Paragraph 3 above. Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3,2005. EBF Second 
SJ Mem. at iv % 4 (citing Certified Copy of Certificate of Death, attached thereto as Exhibit "D")-
This date preceded the date EBF filed a reply to Kay's Counterclaim (filed on July 15, 2005) and 
before the parties had met for the attorneys' planning meeting (held August 1,2005) and commenced 
discovery in this action. (See Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and Case Management Order, 
entered on October 13, 2005.) 
2. The Andrews Family—EBF's Predecessors in Interesf 
6. The official records of Juab County, Utah, reflect that EBF's predecessors in interest 
in the EBF Property include the following: 
(a) The EBF Property was conveyed by the State of Utah to John W. Roundy, Sr. 
by a Quit Claim Deed recorded on September 19,1946. EBF Fiist SJ Mem. at vi ^ 6(a) (citing copy 
of Quit Claim Deed attached thereto as Exhibit CT'). 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, the source of the materia] in Paragraph 6 and its subsections is EBF First SJ Mem. 
at iv-v f 6. See also Kay First SJ Mem. at 3 (not disputing Paragraphs 1-16 of Plaintiff s Statement of Facts). 
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(b) John W. Roundy, Sr. and Mina M. Roundy conveyed the EBF Property to 
Orvil Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews, R. Delos Andrews, and Eldon Verness Andrews by Wan'anty 
Deed recorded on January 14, 1955. EBF First SJ Mem. at vi ^ 6(b) (citing copy of Warranty Deed 
attached thereto as Exhibit CCJ"). 
(c) By Warranty Deeds recorded on August 5,1955, Orville Andrews and Millie 
D. Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews and Anna Lee Andrews, and R. Delos Andrews and Maxine D. 
Andrews conveyed a portion of the EBF Property (including the Nortli lA of the Southeast % of 
Section 4) to Eldon Verness Andrews. EBF First SJ Mem. at vi |^ 6(c) (citing copies of Warranty 
Deeds attached thereto as Exhibit "K"). 
(d) By Warranty Deed recorded on August 5, 1955, Orville Andrews and Millie 
D. Andrews, Neldon V. Andrews and Anna Lee Andrews, R. Delos Andrews and Maxine D. 
Andrews, and Eldon Verness Andrews conveyed a portion of the EBF Property (including the South 
Vi of the Northeast % of Section 4) to Oral Calvert Taylor and Leveda A. Taylor. EBF First S J Mem. 
at vi \ 6(d) (citing copy of Warranty Deeds attached thereto as Exhibit "L"). 
(e) By Warranty Deed recorded on November 6, 1996, R. Delos Andrews, as 
personal representative of the Estates of Orvil Andrews and Millie Jane Durfee Andrews, conveyed 
the Estates5 interest in tire EBF Property to Laveda Andrews Taylor, Eldon Verness Andrews, R. 
Delos Andrews, and Neldon Andrews. EBF First SJ Mem. at vii \ 6(e) (citing copy of Warranty 
Deed attached thereto as Exhibit "M"). 
(f) By the Special Warranty Deed described in Paragraph 2 above, tire EBF 
Property was conveyed to EBF on March 13, 1998. 
C. Testimony of Activity on the West Side of the Fence3 
L Deposition Testimony of Tom Fowkes 
7. Tom Fowkes is the son of Earl and Darlene Fowkes and the grandson of John L. 
Fowkes (referred to in Paragraph 5(a) above). Tom Fowkes has lived at his family's home near 
Mona, Utah, for 'just about 59 years," except for a short period of time when the family lived in 
town. (Tom Fowkes Depo. at 4, 16.) Tom Fowkes was born in 1947. (Id. at 5.) 
8. Earl Fowkes, Tom's father, passed away several years ago, but Darlene still lives in 
Mona. (Id. at 14.) Earl Fowkes started farming his family's property before 1947. (Id. at 34.) 
9. Earl Fowkes had three siblings: Olive, Blanche, and Lucille, none of whom 
participated in farming activities on the family property. (Id at 14-15; 34.) Olive Stanley is the only 
remaining living sister of Earl Fowkes. (Id. at 15.) 
10. Tom's brothers, Dale, Grant, and Glen, also farmed the family property. (Id. at 13.) 
Tom's sister Nancy and brother Wayne "weren't much for farming." (Id.) 
3
 With the exception of Paragraphs 17 and 25, Kay expressly does not dispute the paragraphs below (up to 
and including Paragraph 56), which the Court therefore reproduces from EBF's Memorandum in Support Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. See EBF First SJ Mem. at vii-xix ^ 7-56; Kay First SJ Mem. at 3-5; Kay Motion to 
Strike at 2. The headings and editorial changes (marked by braces ({})) are the Court's own. 
Because the Court denies Kay's motion to strike Paragraphs 17 and 25, see Part II.B. below, they are also 
reproduced here. 
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11 Also, Tom Fowkes testified that Daiyl and Olive Stanley "come down, you know, 
when Gi andpa and Grandma [John and Maud Fowkes] wei e alive Outside of that—the visits would 
have been spaise " (Id at 46-47 ) 
12 [omitted because not cleaily supported by cited portion of the iecoid} 
13 The Fowkes family diy fanned their side of the Ongmal Fence (Id at 12 ) 
14 Tom Fowkes began fanning his family's property when he "was big enough to go" 
with his father (Id at 12 ) He testified that "I know that so I wasn't veiy old when I started going 
with Dad on the tractor and down to do cows and, you know, fuss aiound on the farm " (Id) 
15 During the brief time that the Fowkes family lived m the town of Mona, Tom Fowkes 
continued to woik on the family faim (Id at 17 ) 
16 The Fowkes family continued fanning activities on then piopeity until it was sold to 
Kay (Id at24{ 25}, 47 ) Tom Fowkes himself fanned his family's pi opertyfiom his childhood until 
"[u]p into the c70s, I would assume, maybe even latei than that " (Id at 25 ) 
17 4 Regarding the boundaiy between the pioperties at issue, Tom Fowkes testified as 
follows 
Q All light Looking again at the sui vey, just based on your experience with the 
property and working on the faim, where did you understand the boundaiy to be 
between the properties we've been talking about9 
Answei On the fencelme 
(Id at 18) 
18 The Original Fence was m existence when Tom Fowkes was bom (Id at 23 ) Tom 
Fowkes fuithei testified that his family maintained the Ongmal Fence "on occasion " (Id at 45 ) 
19 Tom Fowkes had dealings with the Andiews family "as long as they weie heie " (Id 
at 26) 
2 Deposition Testimony of Dale Fowkes 
20 Dale Fowkes, Tom's youngei brother, conducted farming activities on the family 
property until it was sold to Kay (Deposition of Dale Fowkes ["Dale Fowkes Depo "] at 
{16,}33-34{} ) {(Tom Fowkes Depo at 24-25 )) 
21 Dale Fowkes testified that his family diyfaimed then property, lotating hay and giam, 
with "the exception of once m awhile" when they weie able to "get the watei to come acioss " (Id 
at 33 ) These fanning activities continued until the yeai 2001 (Id {at 34 }) 
22 In eaihei yeais, the Fowkes family ran livestock on then piopeity (Id at 35 ) 
23 Dale Fowkes fanned the family pioperty under a lease fiom Daryl and Olive Stanley 
foi about ten yeais before the pioperty was sold to Kay {Id at 16-17 ) 
24 Dale Fowkes testified that the Original Fence was in existence when he was bom m 
1949 (Id at 21) 
25 5 Regai ding contact with the Andiews family and the boundaiy between the pioperties, 
Dale Fowkes testified as follows 
See supia note 3 
See supra note 3 
Q 
A 
Q 
How much contact did you have with the—the Andrews? 
Quite a bit. 
What kinds of—what kinds of contact would you have with the Andrews as you 
were— 
A: Oh— 
Q: —working on the farm? 
A: Oh, we traded machinery back and forth, you know, talked—talked fairly often. 
I did work for them and they come and helped me at different times, you know? It's 
just a—a neighborly situation. 
Q: And what kind of work did you do for the Andrews? 
A: Oh, I baled hay for them, trucked, cleaned ground for them. And, like I say, we 
traded machinery back and forth at different times. And then just—just kind of a 
social thing, you know, just as neighbors talk back and forth about different things. 
When I was younger I worked for them, you know, when I was coming through 
school and things like that. 
Q: What did the Andrews do with their side of the—the property or their side of the 
fence line? 
A: When I was younger that—they—they planted some—they did a little dry land 
work up there but that really wasn't their thing, so they planted the grass and run 
livestock in there. 
Q: Okay. Based on your experience with the—the property that we've been talking 
about and you've testified today what was your understanding where the boundary 
was between your family's property and the Andrews property? 
A: The—fence—where the fence was. 
Q: Did you ever speak with anyone in the Andrews family or others who owned that 
property to the east about the boundary? 
A: No. 
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary was between the two 
properties? 
A: Not that I'm aware of. 
(Id at 22-24.) 
D. Testimony of Activity on the East Side of the Fence 
1. Deposition Testimony ofEl don Verness Andrews 
26. As reflected in the Deed described in Paragraph 6(b) above, Eldon Verness Andrews 
("Verness Andrews") was one of the owners of the EBF Property. Pursuant to the Deed described 
in Paragraph 6(c) above, the Andrews family conveyed title to the North V2 of the Southeast lA of 
Section 4 to Verness Andrews. 
27. Verness Andrews was involved with his family's business operations on the Andrews 
property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 1998. (Id. at 36.) 
28. Verness Andews testified about his family's business on the east side of the Original 
Fence as follows: 
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Q. It appears that the deeds in Exhibits 2 or 3 were recorded on or about the same 
date. Can you tell me why the property was conveyed initially to multiple people and 
then—and divided after that? 
A. We operated as a family unit. And when it was conveyed—I don't lcnow what 
time—my father went to an attorney in Nephi and he deeded out different portions 
to different ones of us. He felt that that's something that needed to be done. 
Q. And although there were portions deeded out to different people, was the farming 
operation on the entire parcel? 
A. Yes. We, we operated as a partnership, family partnership. 
Q. What was the name of the partnership? 
A. Orvil Andrews and Sons. You'll find in the records, because it's a long title, we 
wound up Andrews Brothers or various other names that was the official name, yeah. 
(Deposition of Eldon Verness Andrews, June 8, 2007 ["Verness Andrews Depo."], at 9.) 
29. Verness Andrews farther testified as follows: 
Q. I want to ask you a few questions about your family's operations on the property. 
What did your family do with the property on the east side of the fence? 
A. This here (indicating)? Initially— 
Q. Yeah, on the east side. 
A. Initially, we was dry land wheat. 
Q. What year did you start dry land farming? 
A. I don't recall whether it was in 1955 or c56 because we had other parcels. We had 
over 200 acre of wheat allotment, so this might have been the year it was out. I don't 
know. 
Q. So it was 1955 or 56? 
A. c55, c56, yes. It would be. 
Q. How long did your family do the dryland farming? 
A. Well, I am going back fifty years. I am thinking about six years or seven years. 
(Id. at 11.) 
30. After the Andrews family dry farmed their property for a period of time, they began 
to run livestock on their property. (Id. at 13-14.) Verness Andrews testified as follows: 
Q. Were you involved with the cattle operation for the duration of the time your 
family owned the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And just so I understand that cattle operation, then, occurred on . . . occurred to 
the east of the fenceline. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Id. at 14.) 
31. Verness Andrews testified regarding the Original Fence as follows: 
Q. Was the fence there when you family bought the property? 
A. Yes, it was there. It'd been there for quite a few years. 
Q. Do you lcnow what the owners to the west of the fence did with their property? 
A. Well, they, they farmed most of it. 
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Q What kind of farming would they do9 
A Well, they had hay and some giain 
Q How often did you come in contact with the owneis on the west side of the fence9 
A Oh, piobably daily I mean, we weie neighbois We, we weie out woikmg the 
fields, you know, at the same time 
(Id at 15) 
32 Regaidmg the boundanes between the piopeities, Vemess Andiews testified as 
follows 
Q Did you evei have any discussions with the Fowkes family there on the west of 
the fence about wheie the boundaiy was between the pioperties9 
A Not that I know of, no 
Q Were there evei any disputes about where the boundaiy was9 
A No 
Q What was youi undei standing of whei e the boundaiy was between the pi operties9 
A Wheie, wheie the fence went Wheie it originally was 
{Id at 17) 
33 Verness Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family used a plow that "had a 
tendency to throw the dirt up against the fence " {Id at 14-15 ) He testified that "that was fine when 
we was farming against it, but when we put livestock m heie, I lemembei when then hay got giam, 
why, when—a couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through the fence And 
that doesn't make good neighbors, but some of the fence was oldei It was rusty wire so we had to 
leplace the fencing when we went to the livestock operation We had to impiove on it " {Id at 15 ) 
34 Verness Andrews furthei testified as follows "Theie was no dispute about the 
boundaiy The fence was the boundaiy They, they didn't say, 'You got to move your fence' or 
anything else They said, cYoui cows aie on my property '" {Id at 23 ) 
35 The Fowkes family farmed on then side of the Ongmal Fence, the Andiews family 
operated on then side, ct[a]nd the existing fence as we undeistood it was the boundai y line—pi operty 
line " (Id at 22 ) 
36 Vemess Andrews also testified legaidmg the boundary between the pioperties as 
follows 
Q I'm asking if—whethei there was a discussion, if theie was—if people talked 
about the fencelme 
A Not to my knowledge We just accepted that as the boundary line 
Q Okay You undeistood that the fence was boundaiy Conect9 
A Yes, we opeiated as such 
{Id at 24-25, 33 ) 
37 Vemess Andiews testified that, based on the way the Ongmal Fence was constiucted 
with what he called "pioneei baibed wne," he believed the Ongmal Fence "could have been theie 
thnty, forty years befoie [his family] came" in 1955 (Id at 26-27 ) 
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2 Deposition Testimony of R Delos Andiews 
38 R Delos Andiews, who is Vemess Andiews5 biothei,leftthefaniily'sianchm 1958 
and letuinedm 1971 (Deposition ofR Delos Andiews, Januaiy 25,2006 ["Delos Andiews Depo "] , 
at 20) 
39 Aftei leturnmg to the ranch, Delos Andiews "joined again with [his] father and 
bi others m then cattle operation ' on the EBF Property (Id at 21 ) Delos Andrews stayed with his 
family's lanch opeiations until the Andrews family sold the EBF Propeity to EBF m 1998 (Id) 
40 Regarding contact with the Fowkes family, Delos Andiews testified that "Well, it 
wouldn't be on a daily basis, but I thinlc weekly, passing the pickup and wave, and I thinlc fiom time 
to time some visiting " (Id at 22 ) 
41 Delos Andiews testified that the Andiews family used then side of the Original Fence 
foi giazing activities (Id at 19) 
42 Delos Andrews testified that the Original Fence "was theie when we came in the 
spring of c55, and I suppose it had been there for Fd suspect anothei 50 yeais beyond that " (Id at 
46) 
43 Dmmg the time that the Andiews Family owned then property, the Ongmal Fence 
was always visible (Id at 18 ) 
44 The Andrews family peifoimed work on the Original Fence "to keep the cattle out 
of [then] neighboi 's property " (Id at 16 ) 
45 Delos Andiews furthei testified as follows 
Q Did [the Fowkes family] faim the land light up to the fence line? 
A I believe they did, yes 
Q And weie your grazing activities up—up to the fence line— 
A Yes 
(Id at 19) 
46 With respect to the boundary between the properties, Delos Andrews testified as 
follows 
Q Did you evei had any discussion with the property ownei s to the west of the fence 
line about the fence as the boundary of the pioperty oi between the—the two 
piopeities7 
A I nevei lecall evei having a conveisation about the fence line that's—m any 
legaid 
Q Did you undei stand that the fence was the boundai y between the two pi opei ties7 
A Yes 
Q I'm talking—I'm refemng to the old fence 
A Yes, 1 undei stand that the fence line was the pioperty line and [] established the 
ownership 
(Id at 22-23 ) 
47 Delos Andiews furthei testified that theie was "nevei a dispute about the fence" as 
being the boundaiy between the piopeities (Id at 63 ) 
48 Delos Andiews also testified that the Fowkes family nevei acted in amannei 
inconsistent with the Ongmal Fence being the boundaiy between the piopeities (Id at 23 ) 
9 
3 Deposition Testimony of Oral C. Taylor 
49. As reflected in the Deed described in Paragraph 6(b) above, Oral C. Taylor was one 
of the owners of the EBF Property. Pursuant to the Deed described in Paragraph 6(d) above, the 
Andrews family conveyed title to the South lA of the Northeast % of Section 4 to Oral Taylor and his 
wife, Leveda A. Taylor. 
50. Oral Taylor is a brother-in-law of Verness Andrews and Delos Andrews. (Delos 
Andrews Depo. at 24.) 
51. Taylor was involved with the Andrews family business operations on the EBF 
Property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in 1998, although he had 
less frequent involvement in the business after suffering a heart attack in about 1977. (Deposition 
of Oral C. Taylor, June 8, 2007 ["Taylor Depo."], at 6-9.) 
52. Regarding the work he performed for the family business, Taylor testified as follows: 
Q. Tell me a little bit more about what you did personally in the family business on, 
on the property in the survey. 
A. Well, I, I done everything that was there, a little. We didn't have any specific thing 
that we done. Mechanic work, water, hauling hay, grain, run the combine. And then 
the corn—I chopped it, some of them, run the pit sometimes, then we chopped a lot 
of green hay and put it in the pit. I done both on that. 
Q. During the time that you were involved in the business operations, did you come 
into contact with the owners on the west side of the fence? 
A. The, the Fowkeses? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes yes. 
Q. Who did you, who did you come in contact with? Who do you remember? 
A. Well—oh, what's his first name? Grant—the twins was Grant and them—I can't 
remember—Dale, Dale Fowkes was the one that bought it from his folks, which was 
living on the farm when we first moved there. And we got, we got well acquainted 
with all of them. 
Q. So what kind of interactions would you have with the Fowkes family? 
A. I thought we had a real good relationship. Never had any trouble that I know of. 
Q. Did you—do you know what they did with the —the Fowkes family what they did 
with the property on the west side of the fence? 
A. They had—they raised a little hay and a little grain. Other than that, that's all. Of 
course, they built them yards where they fed cattle, Dale did. 
{Id. at 17-19.) 
53. Regarding the boundary between the properties, Taylor testified as follows: 
Q. . . . What, what was your understanding, generally where the boundary was 
between your family's property and the Fowkes' property? 
A. This whole fenceline that was there when we bought the place. It was right 
there—it was there. As far as 1 know, that was original fence. 
Q. Do you know when the fence was built? 
A. I have no idea. It was long before my time. 
{Id at 21-22.) 
10 
F Events Leading to the Pi esent Conti oveisy and Othei Relevant Facts 
54 Sometime aftei pm chasing the Kay Pioperty m 2004, Kay lemoved portions of the 
Ongmal Fence and constmcted a new fence located to the east of the Original Fence EBF demanded 
that Ka> iemove the new fence and lestoie the Ongmal Fence to its pnoi location, but Kay lefused 
(Kay's Answeis to EBF's First Set of Requests foi Admission, at 2 ) 
55 Kay also constructed a new fence located to the east of the Ongmal Fence (Id at 3 ) 
5 6 Although EBF has demanded that Kay remove the new fence and i estoi e the Original 
Tm^s to its prior condition and location, Kay has lefused to do so (Id )6 
57 John L Fowkes, Maud Fowkes, Blanch Cloward, Olive Stanley, and Daiyl Stanley 
have not testified m this case Kay Fust SJ Mem at 6 ^ 12 (citing Affidavit of Steven L Kay), EBf 
Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing) 
58 Neithei Tom Fowkes, Dale Fowkes, noi then paients at any time owned fee title to 
the Kay Piopeity Kay First SJ Mem at 6 % 13 (citing Dale Fowkes Depo at 32-33, Tom Fowkes 
Depo at 35), EBF Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing) 
59 The parties5 piedecessors never had any discussion oi discussions about the Fence, 
oi whether the Fence was or was not a boundai y Kay First S J Mem at 61f 14 (citing Delos Andi ews 
Depo at 18, 22, 48-49, Verness Andrews Depo at 21, 24, 25, Oral Tayloi Depo at 22, 24, Dale 
Fowkes Depo at 23, 50, Tom Fowkes Depo at 39), EBF Second SJ Mem at m (not disputing) 
60 Veiness Andi ews testified that they had some "waywai d cows" go tin ough the fence 
"a couple of times " (Veiness Andi ews Depo at 15 ) 
61 Witnesses gave the following testimony concerning lepan of the Ongmal Fence 
A We did have occasion—we—we grazed that pi opei ty with oui cattle, genei ally 
in the springtime, and so fiom time to time we did, with our neighbois, do a certain 
amount of lepan on it to keep it m—to keep the cattle out of oui neighbor's pi operty 
(Delos Andi ews Depo at 16 ) 
Q Who maintained the fence we aie talking about, which is on the east side of the, 
ciosshatched area? 
A You talking about any particulai time? 
Q Any particulai time 
A Well, like I say, when I was a kid, we woiked on that fence on occasion We did 
after that, but the Ajidiewses woiked on it as well 
(Tom Fowkes Depo at 45 ) 
Q Okay Now when you weie talking with Mi Howe you mentioned 
something about the i epan on this fence and you said you didn't lepan it because you 
stopped running livestock on n7 
A Uh-huh 
Q Explain that to me, would you 
A Whoevei luns livestock it's their lesponsibihty to maintain the fence We didn't 
lun any livestock, Andiewses did, so it's then lesponsibihty to continue to maintain 
6
 The pioperty located m between the location of the Ongmal Fence and the new fence constmcted by Kay 
is lefened to heiem as the "Disputed Pioperty " 
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the fence If both paities aie running livestock then it's up to both parties to continue 
to maintain the fence 
Q That's sort of the mle of the load or— 
A Yup 
(Dale Fowkes Depo at 34 ) 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Thiough its motion foi partial summary judgment, EBF seeks the following lehef Fust, on 
its quiet title claim, EBF seeks (1) a judgment and deciee of quiet title to the disputed pioperty m 
favoi of EBF and against Kay, (2) a judgment and a decree (a) declaring that Kay and any others 
claiming thiough him, have no light, title, estate, mteiest m, oi hen upon, the disputed property, and 
(b) permanently enjoining Kay, and all others claiming through him, fiom encioachmg upon oi 
asserting any adveise claim to the disputed pioperty, and (3) an oidei lequmng Kay to lemove the 
new fence constructed on the disputed pioperty Second, as to its tiespass claim, EBF seeks a 
judgment m its favor and against Kay, m an amount to be determined at a latei time, foi damages 
caused by Kay's tiespass upon the disputed pioperty EBF additionally seeks an oidei dismissing 
Kay's cause of action foi quiet title with piejudice EBF Motion foi Partial Summary Judgment at 
2-3 (filed Sept 17,2007) 
Thiough his cioss motion foi partial summaiy judgment, Kay seeks a judgment decieemg 
that EBF has no claim upon the disputed property under the doctime of boundary by acquiescence 
Defendant Steven L Kay's Qoss-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (filed Oct 25, 2007) 
Kay also seeks to stnke Paragraphs 17 and 25 of Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed and 
Matenal Facts reproduced as Paiagiaphs 17 and 25 in the Factual Background above Defendant 
Steven L Kay's Motion to Stnke at 2 EBF, in turn, lequests that the Comt deny Kay's motion to 
strike EBF Mem Opp'n to Stnke at 2 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings [and] depositions, togethei with 
the affidavits, show that theie is no genuine issue as to any matenal fact and that the moving 
paity is entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) "The cmajoi purpose of 
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessaiy tnal by allowing the parties to pieice the pleadings to 
deteimme whethei theie is a genuine issue to piesent to the fact findei '" Brown v Jorgensen, 2006 
UT App 168, P 20 (quoting Reagan Outdoor Advei Inc v Lundgren, 692 P 2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984)) "A tnal couit is not authonzed to weigh facts m deciding a summary judgment motion, but 
is only to deteimme whether a dispute of material fact exists[ ]" Pigs Gun Club, Inc v Sanpete 
County, 2002 UT 17, P24 In considenng whether a genuine issue exists, the Court views "the facts 
and all leasonable mfeiences diawn theieiiom in the light most favoiable to the nonmcwing paity " 
Higgins v Salt Lake County, 855 P 2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) (quoted m Oivis v Johnson, 2008 UT 
2P6) 
ANALYSIS 
I BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE STANDARD OF PROOF 
Kay states "tins case piesents an issue of fust impression in Utah" as to the standaid of pi oof 
applicable to a boundary by acquiescence claim Kay First SJ Mem at 2 See also id at 11-16 Kay 
states the appiopnate standaid of proof is not articulated m lecent decisions fiom eithei the Utah 
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Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals /rf at 11 (citing Ault v Holden, 44 P 3d 781 (2002) 
RHNCorp v Veibell, 96 P 3d 935 (Utah 2004), Mwow v Loveless, 24P 3d997,1003 (Utah App 
2001), Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v Babcock, 993 P 2d 229 (Utah App 1999)) Kay aigues the 
appiopnate standard is cleai and convincing evidence, see Kay Fust SJ Mem at 10-16, and EBF 
advocates a piepondeiance standard (See EBF Second SJ Mem at 1-3 ) 
The applicable standaid of proof is relevant to the Court's mquny on summaiy judgment See 
Andalex Resources v Myers, 871 P 2d 1041, 1047 (Utah Ct App 1994) ("In giantmg a motion for 
summary judgment, a trial judge must considei each element of the claim undei the appropnate 
standaid of pi oof), id (citing cases fiom U S Supieme Court and Utah courts) Foi example, in 
Republic Group v Won-Door Corp , plaintiff alleged fiaud The Utah Court of Appeals stated that 
fiaud must be pioved by cleai and convincing evidence, and that standaid should be consideied on 
a motion foi summary judgment couits m that cncumstance should considei whethei the plaintiff 
has "provided evidence which, if accepted by the tnei of fact as tiue, would meet the cleai and 
convincing standaid required to establish a fiaud claim " 883 P 2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
Similaily, in Anderson v Libby Lobby, the United States Supreme Court held that wheie a 
defamation claim lequired clear and convincing proof, "the trial judge's summaiy judgment inquiry 
as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence piesented is such that a juiy 
applying that evidentiary standard could leasonably find foi either the plaintiff oi the defendant "477 
U S 242,255 (1986) (emphasis added) See also West v Lincoln Benefit Life Co ,509F 3dl60,171 
(3d Cir 2007) ("When the party moving foi summaiy judgment beais the bin den of piovmg certain 
facts by cleai and convincing evidence, we must evaluate the facts m support of the motion in light 
of that evidentiary burden ") (quoting Anderson, 477 U S at 252) 7 Given the importance of the 
applicable standard of pi oof to the Court's summaiy judgment niquiiy, the Court considei s, fust, 
whethei Utah law currently provides the appropnate standard as to boundary by acquiescence claims 
"Boundaiy by acquiescence is a long established doctime m Utah " Mason v Loveless, 2001 
UT App 145, P17 (Utah Ct App 2001) Indeed, "[i]t was first mentioned m Smtzgable v 
Worseldine, 5 Utah 315 (1887) but was held inapplicable in that case The first Utah application of 
the principle was in Holmes v Judge, 31 Utah 269 (1906) " Hales v Frakes, 600 P 2d 556, 558 
(Utah 1979) Thioagh many leported opinions that now span moie than a centuiy, the doctime has 
undeigone significant development An equitable doctime, see Massey v Gi iffiths, 2005 UT App 
410, PI 1, boundary by acquiescence includes the following foui elements ct(i) occupation up to a 
visible line maiked by monuments, fences, oi buildings, (n) mutual acquiescence m the line as a 
boundai y, (in) foi a long penod of time, (iv) by adjoining landownei s " RHN Coip v Veibell, 2004 
UT 60, P23 (quoting Jacobs v Hafen, 917 P 2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)) These elements are, of 
couise, the lesult of caieful dehbeiation ovei time that has, foi example, even added and then 
Ievoked an additional element See Halladay v Cluff 685 P 2d 500, 505 (Utah 1984) (establishing 
1
 See also Anchoi age Realty Tiustv Donovan, 2004 ME 137, PI 5 (Me 2004) In Maine, wheie boundary 
by acquiescence must be pi oven by ' cleai and convincing evidence," a plaintiff seeking to establish a boundaiy by 
acquiescence on summary judgment must show she "would be entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law and that a 
fact-finder would be compelled to find it highly piobable that those elements have been established " Id (citation 
omitted) 
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an "objective uncertainty55 requirement to the boundary by acquiescence claim) and Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) (overruling Halladay's "objective uncertainty55 element). 
Utah courts have also articulated the policies served by the doctrine. The landmark case 
Staker v. Ainsworth revisited the policies served by the doctrine. 785 P.2d at 423. The Court noted 
the doctrine "fills an important gap in the law left unaddressed by other doctrines[ J " including the 
two other major doctrines used to settle disputes between adjoining landowners—estoppel and 
boundary by agreement. Id. & n.4 (citing BACKMAN, THE LAW OF PRACTICAL LOCATION OF 
BOUNDARIES AND THE N E E D FOR AN ADVERSE POSSESSION REMEDY, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957, 
962-68). To illustrate the important role served by boundary by acquiescence, the Court stated the 
following: 
For instance, settling a dispute under boundary by agreement requires that there was 
an express agreement between the parties. If actual knowledge of the boundary exists, 
there is no consideration exchanged and the agreement fails. Since sufficient proof 
of an agreement is often difficult to come by, the doctrine of boundary by agreement 
is not often invoked. There are similar problems in applying the estoppel theory to 
settle boundary disputes. Thus, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, based 
largely on policy considerations (of avoiding litigation and promoting stability in 
landownership) fills a small but important gap. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from realization, 
ancient in our law, that peace and good order of society is [sic] best 
served by leaving at rest possible disputes over long established 
boundaries. Its essence is that where there has been any type of a 
recognizable physical boundary, which has been accepted as such for 
a long period of time, it should be presumed that any dispute or 
disagreement over the boundary has been reconciled in some manner. 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 423 (quoting Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (alteration in 
original)). See also Mason, 2001 UT App at PI7 (stating the doctrine's purpose is "stability in 
boundaries, repose of titles, and the prevention of litigation.") (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
A. Standard of Proof Applied in Previous Utah Cases 
Among the many reported appellate decisions considering the doctrine, several review claims 
that a trial court's conclusion as to the issue was or was not supported by sufficient evidence. See, 
e.g., Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457 (Utah 1935); Johnson v. Sessions, 25 Utah 2d 133 (1970); 
Universal Inv. Corp. v Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35 (1971); Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974); 
JuddFamily Ltd Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990); Gillmor v Cummings, 904 
P.2d 703 (Utah 1995); RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60; Argyle v Jones, 2005 UT App 346; 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168. in short, it is indisputable that Utah trial and appellate 
courts, for several decades now, have been reviewing evidence and determining whether it is 
sufficient to establish boundaries by acquiescence. The question Kay raises, then, is not whether 
Utah courts have been applying a particular standard of proof in such cases, but which standard of 
proof they have been applying. Kay accurately notes that among the many reported decisions 
considering the doctrine, there is a dearth of express discussion on the standard of proof applied. Kay 
F i r s t s J Mem. at 11-12. 
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Kay aigues a leview of cases on the doctime demonstiates Utah couits have m fact, sub 
silentio, been applying a "clear and convincing" standaid all along Id at 12 hi support of this 
mfeience, Kay points to a vanety of cases fiom 1935 (Nelson v Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457) to the neai-
piesent {Brown v Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168) As noted above, none of the cases cited by Kay 
articulate a standaid of pi oof While aigumg that "Utah, m fact, adheies to a cleai, convincing 
evidence standaid when granting relief under the [d]octnne[,]" Kay notes that "[i]n almost all of 
these cases, the evidence of acquiescence was m the foim of affirmative acts of the parties oi then 
piedecessois " Kay Fust SJ Mem at 13 As this latter statement suggests, Kay's aiguments offei 
bettei support to an element of the acquiescence doctime (mutual acquiescence in a visible line as 
a boundaiy) than to an aigument that Utah couits have been applying a cccleai and convincing" 
standaid of pi oof 
Indeed, the Court's leview of Utah cases on the doctime leads it to the opposite conclusion 
foi at least thiee leasons Fust, absent a contiaiy indication, thepiesumed standard of pi oof is civil 
cases is apiepondeiance of the evidence See Hansen v Hansen, 958 P 2d 931, 934-35 (Utah 1998) 
("the standard of proof generally applied m civil proceedings is the pieponderance of the evidence 
standard") (citing Johns v Shulsen, 111 P 2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), Lipman v Industrial 
Com??7X592P2d616,618(Utahl979),Mormv Farmers Home Mut Ins Co ,500 P 2d 505,507 
(\912\Harkenv BoardofOil, Gas & Mining, 920 P 2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996)) When a court 
applies a parti culai standaid m pi oof to a civil case and does not state standaid being applied, it is 
most rational to piesume the standaid being applied is a piepondeiance of the evidence 
Second, the "clear and convincing" standaid is itself a high buiden to meet Given the 
difficulty of meeting that buiden and the considerable numbei of Utah cases that have consideied 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in boundary by acquiescence cases, one would expect 
to see frequent and explicit refeience to such a high standaid m the leported decisions However, no 
express lefeience is made See Lovett v Continental Bank & Trust Co , 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79 (Utah 
1955) (describing the preponderance standard as a finding "that the existence of the disputed facts 
are moi e pi obable than their nonexistence," describing the clear and convincing standard as a finding 
"that the existence of the disputed facts are veiy highly probable," and noting that the latter standaid 
"appioaches that degiee of pioof lequned in a cnminal case"), Egbert v Nissan N Am , Inc , 2007 
UT 64, PP 12-13 (descnbmg the cleai and convincing standaid as "[t]he mteimediate standaid of 
pi oof5 between piepondeiance and the cnminal standaid of beyond a leasonable doubt) 
Thud, this Couit locates only one lepoited boundaiy by acquiescence case expiessly 
lefeiencmg a standard of pi oof—Gillmor v Cummmgs, 904 P 2d 703 (Utah 1995) Theie, the tnal 
couit found that Cummmgs, the pioponent of boundaiy by acquiescence, had failed to show such 
a boundaiy had been established The Couit of Appeals of Utah leviewed the evidence and affiimed 
the trial court's holding thus ct[W]e find sufficient evidence to support the tnal couit's finding that 
Cummmgs failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that he had established a new boundaiy 
by acquiescence " 904 P 2d at 707 (emphasis added) The Couit of Appeals m Gillmor cleai]y did 
not considei the question of the appropnate standaid of pi oof on its ments, and thus its statement 
lefeiencmg such a standaid is dicta with aiguably limited piecedential value The Couit also notes 
that Gillmor upheld the tnal couit's finding that a boundaiy by acquiescence had not been 
established by paity advocating application of the doctrine Howevei, given those possible 
limitations, the above-quoted language fiom Gillmor clearly implies the appiopnate standaid of 
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pioof is aprepondeiance of the evidence This express lefeience to a standard of pioof likely leflects 
the standaid courts have been applying to such cases all along 
B Appropriate Standard of Proof 
In addition to his aiguments that Utah couits have been applying a cleai and convincing 
standaid all along, Kay offeis additional reasons foi applying the standaid He atgues a cleai and 
convincing standaid is appiopnate because (1) the standaid is applied in the leal piopeity doctnnes 
of public dedication, piescnptive easements, deed lefoimation foi mistake, and adveise possession 
founded on paiol gifts, Kay First SJ Mem at 15 Kay Second SJ Mem at 10-12, and (2) othei 
jmisdictions have adopted the standaid foi boundaiy by acquiescence claims, Kay Fust SJ Mem at 
16, Kay Second SJ Mem at 10-11 
1 Use of the clear and convincing standard in other contexts 
Kay argues the clear and convincing standard should be applied m cases of boundaiy by 
acquiescence because it is applied m cases of public dedication of a I oad, see Campbell v Box Elder 
County, 962 P 2d 806, 808 (Utah App 1998), State ex rel Div of Forestry Fire & State Lands v 
Six Mile Ranch Co , 132 P 3d 687 (Utah App 2006), piescnptive easements, see Mar chant v Park 
City, 771 P 2d 677 (Utah App 1989),iefoimationof a deed foi mistake, see Gray v Gray, 160P2d 
432 (Utah 1945), and adverse possession founded on a paiol gift, see Raleigh v Wells, 81 P 908 
(Utah 1905) Kay Fust SJ Mem at 14-15 (citing, inter aha, the above cases) Kay aigues "[t]he 
common theme to all these cases is that when a court divests a party of a leal property mteiest, a 
showing of cleai and convincing evidence is required " Id at 15 
But Kay's statement oveilooks what may be a significant distinctions between the above 
doctnnes and boundary by acquiescence Fust, boundary by acquiescence may also be distinguished 
fiom public dedication of a road "[Bjecause the law does not lightly allow the tiansfei of piopeity 
fiom private to public use, the [government] bears the burden of piovmg dedication to tire public by 
cleai and convincing evidence " Six Mile Ranch Co , 2006 UT App P36 (citations and internal 
quotation maiks omitted) Draper City v Estate ofBernaido, 888 P 2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995)) 
In contiast, "boundary by acquiescence cannot be established when one of the adjoining tracts of 
land is part of the public domain " Cat tei v Ham ath, 925 P 2d 960, 962 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted) Because boundaiy by acquiescence does not contemplate transfers of land from public to 
pnvate use, the heightened standard of proof cannot be applied to the acquiescence doctime on that 
basis 
Second, lefoimation of a deed is appiopnate only aftei a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence, Bown v Loveland, 678 P 2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984) It is appiopnate "'wheie the teims of 
the wi ltten msti ument ai e mistaken m that they do not show the ti ue intent of the agi eement between 
the paities Theie aie two giounds foi lefoimation of such an agi eement mutual mistake of the 
paities and ignoiance oi mistake by one paity, coupled with fiaud by the othei paity "' RHN Corp 
v Veibell, 96 P 3d 935, P36 (Utah 2004) (quoting Hottinger v Jensen, 684 P 2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 
1984)) The elements lequned to lefoim a deed obviously diffei fiom boundaiy by acquiescence and 
it is not immediately apparent to the Court why use of the same standard of proof m both contexts 
would be appiopnate 
Thud, while the doctrines of piescnptive easement and adverse possession adjudicate claims 
adverse to the opposing landownei 5s mteiest, boundaiy by acquiescence concerns claims based on 
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mutual acceptance of a boundaiy by piedecessois in mteiest See Stakei, 785 P 2d at 423 (quoting 
Baum v Defa, 525 P2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (descnbing boundaiy by acquiescence as a 
piesumption that a boundaiy dispute has been pieviously leconciled wheie a lecogmzable physical 
boundaiy "has been accepted as such foi a long penod of time") At least one court has found this 
distinction sufficient to justifying different standaids of pi oof Walteis v Snyder 570 N W 2d 301, 
303 (Mich App 1997) (aA claim of acquiescence does not lequne that the possession be hostile oi 
without permission Thus, application of the highei standaid of proof seems mappiopriate to an 
acquiescence claim55) 
Finally, the Court notes the Utah Supieme Couit's lecent indication that it is disinclined to 
unduly lestiict what is alleady a lestuctive doctrine In RHN Corp v Veibell, the paity opposing 
boundary by acquiescence aigued that one of the deeds tiansfenmg the pioperty at issue placed a 
party "on constiuctive notice of the lecoid boundaiy 55 2004 UT 60, P 28 The Couit rejected the 
"constiuctive notice55 aigument on the following grounds "To allow constiuctive notice of the tiue 
boundaiy m the conveying deed to negate acquiescence would unduly lestiict the doctime of 
boundaiy by acquiescence by preempting claims whenevei parties mutually acquiesce m a visible 
line that conflicts with a lecoid boundary contained in the conveying document " Id The Court then 
stated that the "constiuctive notice55 argument biought to mind the "objective uncertainty" 
lequnement the Court eliminated fiom the acquiescence analysis m Stoker v Ainswoi th Accoidmg 
to the Court, "We eliminated this fifth lequn em ent because it cmakes boundaiy by acquiescence less 
piactical, further lestucts what was alieady a lestuctive doctime, and effectively elimmate[s] 
boundary by acquiescence as a viable doctime foi settling propeity disputes in Utah "' Id P 29 
(quoting Stakei, 785 P 2d at 423) (additional internal quotation maiks and citation omitted) Given 
the already-iestnctive requnements of the doctime (including twenty yeais of occupation up to an 
mutual acquiescence m a visible line as a boundary), imposing a cleai and convmcmg standaid of 
proof on the doctrine may unduly narrow its applicability 
2 Use of the cleai and convincing and preponderance standards in other jurisdictions 
Kay accuiately notes that several othei states apply a clear and convincing standaid to the 
boundary by acquiescence question Kay Fust SJ Mem at 16 The tieatise POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY notes that "sevei al states i equne that the claimant pi ove 1 ecogmtion and acquiescence by 
cleai and convincing evidence oi some closely allied standaid," and cites case law fiom Iowa, Maine, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Veimont, and Washington 8 
The Powell treatise notes that £C[a]mong the leasons given foi the cleai and convincing 
standaid aie (1) to discouiage aggressive, assertive action inconsistent with goodneighboihness, (2) 
to avoid a flood of litigation, and (3) to naiiowly tailor a doctrine that transfeis title to piopeity 
9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05[8] (Michael Allan Wolfed , LexisNexis Matthew Bendei 2007) 
(citing Tewesv Pine Lane Faims, 522 N W 2d 801 (Iowa 1994), Daitv Thompson, 154 N W 2d 82 (Iowa 1967), 
Qosbyv Baizley, 642 A 2d 150 (Me 1994), Davis v Mitchell, 628 A 2d 657 (Me 1993), Maija Coip v Allain, 
622 A 2d 1182 (Me 1993), Tayloi v Hanson, 541 A 2d 155 (Me 1988), Calthoipe v Abi ahamson, 44] A 2d 284 
(Me 1982), Wojahn v Johnson, 297 N W 2d 298 (Minn 1980), Manz v Bohai a, 367 N W 2d 743 (N D 1985), 
Lien v Beaid, 478 N W 2d 578 (S D 1991), Heath v Dudley, 530 A 2d 151, 153 (Vt 1987), Lilly v Lynch, 945 
P 2d 727 (Wash App 1997)) But see id (stating "othei courts lequue only a fan pi eponderance of the evidence") 
(citing Walteisv Snyder, 570 N W2d 301 (Mich App 1997)) 
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without compliance with the statute of frauds " 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05 [8] (citing 
Manz) But none of those aiguments persuade the Court that the clear and convincing standaid 
should be applied in Utah First, the cleai and convincing standard seems equally or moie likely than 
the preponderance standard to promote aggressive behavior inconsistent with good neighboilmess 
True, it seems that one is less likely, ex ante, to attempt to establish an mconect boundaiy when he 
laiows he would be lequned, twenty yeais latei, to piove acquiescence by cleai and convincing 
evidence as opposed to a prepondei ance of evidence On the othei hand, howevei, a lecent giantee 
of property is less likely to distuib a longstanding boundary if he knows pnoi acquiescence may be 
pi oven by meie prepondei ance of the evidence Foi similar leasons, it is not cleai that a 
piepondeiance standaid would engendei more litigation than a cleai and convincing standard 
Finally, a doctrine that permits transfer of ownership m contradiction of lecoid boundaries and 
without compliance with the statute of frauds should be appropriately nan owed But as noted above, 
the doctrine itself is "aheady a restnctive doctrine," Veibell, 2004 UT P 29, and the Utah Supreme 
Court has expiessed leluctance to "unduly lestnct" it Id P 28 
The Powell ti eatise also notes that othei courts have I equn ed only a pi epondei ance standai d 
9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68 05[8] (citing Walters v Snydei, 570 N W 2d 301 (Mich App 
1997)) In Walters v Snyder, the Couit of Appeals of Michigan explicitly held that while a "cleai 
and cogent evidence" standaid applies to adveise possession claims biought m Michigan, a 
pieponderance of the evidence standaid governs boundaiy by acquiescence claims 570N W 2d 301, 
303 (Mich App 1997) The Michigan court concluded the heightened standard was inappropriate 
because, unlike adverse possession claims, claims of boundary by acquiescence do not require the 
element of hostility 
hi contrast to a claim of adveise possession that requnes a showing by cleai 
and cogent evidence that the possession was "actual, visible, open, notorious, 
exclusive, continuous, and unmtenupted foi tire statutoiy penod of 15 yeais, hostile 
and under covei of a claim of ughtf J" a claim of acquiescence to a boundaiy line 
based upon the statutory period of fifteen years lequnes meiely a showing that the 
parties acquiesced m the line and tieated the line as the boundaiy foi the statutoiy 
period, mespeutive of whether there was a bona fide controveisy legaidmg the 
boundary A claim of acquiescence does not require that the possession be hostile or 
without permission Thus, application of the highei standaid of pi oof seems 
inappropriate to an acquiescence claim 
As furthei support for om conclusion, this Court in Sackett recently affirmed a tiial 
couit decision finding acquiescence foi the statutoiy penod by a piepondeiance of 
the evidence Although the piopnety of the standaid used was not challenged on 
appeal, nonetheless, in leviewmgthetnal court's findings and conclusions, this Court 
did not disappiove of the standaid used and affnmed the decision of the lowei court 
See also 12 AM JUR 2D, BOUNDARIES, § 99, p 634, indicating that one lelymg upon 
a claim of acquiescence must show it by such a pi epondei ance of the evidence as will 
entitle him to the boundaiy claimed 
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Id (internal quotation maiks and citations omitted)9 
Foi the leasons stated above, the Court concludes, fust, that Utah courts histoncally have 
likely applied a pieponderance standaid to boundary by acquiescence claims, and second, that the 
preponderance standard adequately protects the mteiests at stake m claims raising what is already 
a lestrictive doctrine In any case, the issue of the standard of proof would not affect the outcome of 
this case Looking to its facts, the Court concludes the evidence supporting application of boundary 
by acquiescence meets the cleai and convincing standard, and therefoie the lesult is the same 
legaidless of the standard used 
II ELEMENTS OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
An equitable doctime, see Massey v Griffiths, 2005 UT App 410, P l l , boundaiy by 
acquiescence includes the following fom elements "(i) occupation up to a visible line maiked by 
monuments, fences, 01 buildings, (n) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundaiy, (in) foi a long 
penod of time, (IV) by adjoining landowners " RHN Corp v Veibell, 2004 UT 60, P 23 (quoting 
Jacobsv Hafen, 917P2d 1078,1080 (Utah 1996)) "The requnement that mutual acquiescence be 
foi a long penod of time has been mteipieted m Utah to mean at least twenty yeais " Veibell, 2004 
UT P 30 (citing Jacobs v Hafen, 917 P 2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996), Hobson v Panguitch Lake 
Corp , 530 P 2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975)) 
In considenng arguendo whethei the parties5 evidence is sufficiently compelling to grant 
summary judgment undei the cleai and convincing standaid (although the Couit concludes only a 
piepondeiance is necessary), the Court follows a stiaightforwaid formulation fiom the Supieme 
Court of Maine, which standard seems consistent with the "cleai and convincing5' standaid applied 
m other areas of Utah law In Maine, wheie boundaiy by acquiescence must be pi oven by "cleai and 
convincing evidence," a plaintiff seeking to establish a boundaiy by acquiescence on summary 
judgment must show she "would be entitled to a judgment as a mattei of law and that a fact-finder 
would be compelled to find it highly piobable that those elements have been established " Id 
(citation omitted) Anchorage Realty Trust v Donovan, 2004 ME 137, PI5 (Me 2004) Cf Lovett 
v Continental Bank & Trust Co, 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79 (Utah 1955) (desciibmg the clear and 
convincing standaid as sufficient to convince the tnei of that "that the existence of the disputed facts 
aie veiy highly piobable") 
The parties do not dispute that the Oiigmal Fence has been in existence sufficiently long to 
satisfy element (m) (Kay Second SJ Mem at 12 (stating Kay "acknowledges that the [fjence m 
question has been m existence foi a long penod of time (the thud element of [bjoundaiy by 
[acquiescence)"), EBF Fn st SJ Mem at 3 (noting that Delos Andi ews, Veiness Andi ews, and Oral 
Tayloi testified the Ongmal Fence had been m existence since at least 1955 (citing facts set forth 
lepioduced in above Factual Backgiound as Paiagiaphs 31,42, and 53), and that Tom Fowkes and 
Dale Fowkes, bom m 1947 and 1949, respectively, testified that the Original Fence was m existence 
9
 Kay also relies on the AM JUR boundaries tieatise m arguing foi the opposite lesult leached by the 
Michigan Court Kay Fust SJ Mem at 12 The language in that souice seems confusingly to combine the two 
standards of proof, but certainly does not repudiate the piepondeiance standaid u[0]ne lelymg upon acquiescence 
must show it by such a prepondei ance of the evidence, often designated as cleai and convincing evidence, as will 
entitle him oi hei to the boundary claimed " 12 AM JUR 2D BOUNDARIES § 104 (2007) (citations omitted) 
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when they were born (citing facts set forth reproduced in above Factual Background as Paragraphs 
18 and 24); Kay First SJ Mem. at 3, 5 (not disputing any of Paragraphs 18, 24, 31, 42, or 53).) 
The Court now addresses the remaining three elements. Because of its relevance to the other 
two elements, the Court first considers element (iv) and particularly whether, as Kay claims, the 
testimony of Tom and Dale Fowkes "is of no probative value on the issue of acquiescence by [Kay's] 
predecessors-in-title" because Tom and Dale Fowkes never held the Kay Property in fee title Kay 
Second SJ Mem at 14. 
A Adjoining Landowners 
The parties do not dispute that the properties at issue are adjoining and contiguous parcels 
of land and that EBF and Kay are the record owners of the respective properties. (EBF First S J Mem 
at iv ^  3-4; id at 2; Kay First S J Mem at 3; Answer and Counterclaim at 5 If 29 (stating EBF "owns 
property immediately adjacent to Kay's property"); Reply to Counterclaim at 2 ^ 29 ("EBF admits 
that it owns property immediately adj acent to property purportedly owned by Kay.55)). However, Kay 
argues that Tom and Dale Fowkes5 testimony is irrelevant to the issue of acquiescence by "adjoining 
landowners55 because, although they worked on the pi operty for many years, they were nevei holders 
of fee-title in the Kay Property. Therefore, Kay argues, their testimonies, reproduced in Paragraphs 
17 and 25 above, should be stricken.10 See Kay Strike Mem. at 2-3; Kay First SJ Mem. at 20-21; 
Kay Second SJ Mem. at 13-16; Kay Reply Strike Mem. at 2-5. 
Kay also argues Tom and Dale Fowkes' testimony in Paragraphs 17 and 25 should be stricken because in 
their depositions they indicated the Ongmal Fence was wheie they "undei stood" the boundary between the 
properties to be (or was then "understanding" legardmg that boundary), and, according to Kay, then 
"understanding" concerning the boundaiy "may be heaisayf ]" Kay Sti ike Mem at 2-5 The disputed testimony is, hi 
l elevant part, as follows 
Q All right Looking again at the sin vey, just based on youi expei lence with the pi operty and 
woikmg on the faim, where did you understand the boundary to be between the pioperties we've 
been talking about7 
Answei On the fenceline 
(Tom Fowkes Depo at 18 ) 
Q Okay Based on youi expenence with the—the property that we've been talking aboul and 
you've testified today what was your understanding where the boundaiy was between youi family's 
pi operty and the Andi ews pi operty? 
A The—fence—where the fence was 
(Dale Fowkes Depo at 23 ) 
Kay's heaisay objection based on the single woid "undeistanding" points to no out-of-court statement and 
thus can only speculate as to a possible basis in heaisay Moie significantly, Kay's objection to this testimony 
ovei looks the veiy questions asked, which expiessly sought the deposed's undei standings of the boundaiy based on 
their experience with it Tom Fowkes Depo at 18 (asking legaiding the boundaiy "fj]ust based on youi experience 
with the pi operty and woikmg on the faim, wheie did you undei stand "), Dale Fowkes Depo at 23 (ct[b]ased on 
youi expenence with the pi operty that we've been talking about what was youi understanding ") See 
State v Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, PI 6 ("Lay fact testimony has always been a primary, acceptable souice of 
evidence m our system Accoidingly, lay fact testimony . is admissible so long as it complies with othei portions 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, including rule 602's requiiement that a witness have peisonal knowledge of the 
matter about which he or she is testifying ") (citations omitted) As such, Kay's motion to strike the Fowkes' 
testimony based on heaisay is denied 
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in RHN Corp. v. Veibell. There, the 
party opposing recognition of a boundary by acquiescence noted the absence of direct testimony that 
the relevant holders of fee title, both of whom were deceased, believed that the fence at issue was 
the boundary. 2004 UT P26. In response, the Court explained that ubecause acquiescence may be 
inferred from the landowner's actions, the absence of direct evidence of a PJ^£wner 's subjective 
belief concerning the boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual acquiescence.55 Id (citing Stoker, 
785 P.2d at 420-21) (emphasis added). The Court noted "[tjhis especially holds true where that 
owner is deceased and unable to testify." Id. The Court then applied the above rules to the facts of 
Veibell, noting the evidence, based at least in part on the testimony of a /?0«-Iando wner (the fee-title 
holder's brother) from which acquiescence could reasonably inferred:-" ~~ 
The Ericksens' recognition of the fence as a boundary can be reasonably 
inferred from the evidence presented at trial. Durell Ericksen's brother, Bryce, who 
worked on the farm during the 1960s, testified that he always believed that the fence 
was the true boundary. The Ericksens' actions over the years also indicate that they 
have recognized the fence as a boundary. They have farmed up to the fence line since 
1938, and they never occupied the land south of the fence. Furthermore, the 
Ericksens never objected to the fence line as the boundary. In light of these facts, the 
trial court's inference of the Ericksens5 acquiescence is not clearly erroneous. 
Id. P 27. Significantly, the above explanation affirms an inference of acquiescence based on activity 
of the relevant family and not based solely on evidence relating to the fee-title holders themselves. 
Indeed, the subjective belief of Bryce Eriksen—the brother of Durell Eriksen, the fee-title 
holder—was expressly considered in the analysis and was therefore probative to the issue of 
acquiescence. Under Veibell, then, the fact that Tom and Dale Fowkes were not owners of the Kay 
Property does not render their testimony irrelevant as to the issue of acquiescence. 
Here, all of the prior owners of the Kay Property are deceased except for Olive Stanley who, 
Tom Fowkes testified, did not participate in farming activities on the property. (Tom Fowkes Depo. 
at 14-15, 34, 46.)11 Thus, Tom and Dale Fowkes5 testimony is likely the only basis from which 
acquiescence by the prior landowners can be inferred. Additionally, their testimony provides a 
reasonable basis for such an inference: both testified that as boys they assisted their father and their 
/J grandfather—their grandfather being a fee-title holder—with the farm operations. (Dale Fowkes 
/ Depo. at 16; Tom Fowkes Depo. at 12; Factual Background \ 5.) Later, both worked extensively on 
the farm as adults. (See Tom Fowkes Depo. at 25) (testifying he farmed his family's property until 
"[u]p into the c70s, I would assume, maybe even later than that'5); Dale Fowkes Depo. at 33-34 
(using the land until 2001).) Their experiences relative to the farming activities on the Kay Property 
from childhood (which included exposure to the farming activities of their father and grandfather 
on the property) through adulthood certainly form a basis from which, if appropriate, acquiescence 
can be reasonably inferred. Kay5s motion to strike their testimony on grounds of irrelevance is thus 
denied. 
11
 Tom Fowkes further testified that Olive came down to the Kay Property when her grandparents, John 
and Maud Fowkes (who died in 1957 and 1965, respectively) were alive, but that, "[a]fter that, the visits would have 
been sparse." Id at 46-47; EBF Second SJ Mem. at iv ffi| 1-2. 
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B. Occupation up to a Visible Line 
In Stoker v. Ainsworth, the Utah Supreme Court listed the following activities as indicative 
of occupation up to a visible line: "[hjouses were built and occupied; land was farmed, improved, 
and irrigated; and livestock was kept. Lynn Ainsworth 5s affidavit, for instance, is typical in that it 
indicates that the Ainsworth family has farmed the property within the fence lines since at least 
1930." 785 P.2d 417,420. These are the same types of activities the Andrews and Fowkes families 
conducted on their respective properties for over forty years. For instance, Delos Andrews testified 
that the fence was always visible during the time the Andrews family owned the EBF Property. 
(Delos Andrews Depo. at 18.) For most of the years the Andrews family owned the EBF Property, 
they used their side of the Original Fence for grazing. (Verness Andrews Depo. at 11-15; Delos 
Andrews Depo. at 18-19.) On the other hand, the Fowkes family used their side of the Original 
Fence for dry fanning. (Tom Fowkes Depo. at 11-12; Dale Fowkes Depo. at 33.) Delos Andrews' 
testimony on the element of occupation up to a visible line is particularly relevant: 
Q: Did [the Fowkes family] farm the land right up to the fence line? 
A: I believe they did, yes. 
Q: And were your grazing activities up—up to the fence line— 
A: Yes. 
(Delos Andrews Depo. at 19.) 
Verness Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family used a plow that "had a tendency to 
throw the dirt up against the fence." (Id. at 14-15.) He testified that "that was fine when we was 
farming against it, but when we put livestock in here, I remember when their hay got grain, why, 
when—a couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through the fence. And that 
doesn't make good neighbors, but some of the fence was older. It was rusty wire so we had to replace 
the fencing when we went to the livestock operation. We had to improve on it." (Id. at 15.) These 
facts also plainly indicate occupation up to a visible line. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that the respective land owners and their families ever 
attempted to use the property on the other side of the Original Fence for any purpose. Accordingly, 
the first element of boundary by acquiescence has been met. 
C. Mutual Acquiescence 
The Supreme Court in Veibell provided the following guidance on the issue of mutual 
acquiescence: 
"Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to 
establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish that the 
parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties." Ault v. Holden, 
2002 UT 33, PI 8. To acquiesce means to "recognize and treat an observable line, 
such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the adjacent 
landowner's property." Id. Acquiescence is a "highly fact-dependent question," see 
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256, and "acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred 
from evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may 
evidence the landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the 
demarcation between the properties." Ault, 2002 UT 33 at PI 8. 
22 
Courts have looked at vaiious landownei actions as evidence of acquiescence 
m a visible line as a boundaiy Occupation up to, but nevei ovei, the line is evidence 
of acquiescence See Stoker v Ainsworth, 785 P 2d 417, 420-21 (Utah 1990) 
(weighing the fact that "owneis occupied houses, constructed buildings, farmed, 
ungated, and laised livestock only within then lespective fenced aieas" (emphasis 
added)), RICHARD R POWELL & MICHAEL ALLEN ROHAN, 9 POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 68 05 [6][d] (2004) (noting that "'cultivating up to, but never ovei, a 
line'" is evidence of acquiescence (quoting Knutson v Jensen, 440 N W 2d 260,263 
(N D 1989)) Howevei, occupation by itself may m some cases be insufficient to 
establish acquiescence See Hales v Frakes, 600 P 2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979) 
("Plaintiffs occupation to the fence without mteifeience was not sufficient to 
establish defendant's acquiescence m the fence as a boundaiy ") Acquiescence may 
also be shown by silence, oi the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary 
See Judd Family Ltd P'ship v Hutchings, 797 P 2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990) 
(weighing the fact that "not once did Judd then suggest oi imply that the fence was 
not m the pi oper location"), Stoker, 785 P 2d at 420-21 (weighing the fact that "thei e 
[was] no indication m the lecord that any predecessor m interest behaved m a fashion 
inconsistent with the belief that the fence line was the boundary" and that "there 
[was] no indication that any landownei evei notified his neighboi of a disagreement 
ovei the hue boundary" m finding mutual acquiescence), Mason v Loveless, 2001 
UT App 145, P20, 24 P 3d 997 ("Om settled case law cleaily piovides that 
acquiescence may be established by silence ") 
2004 UT PP 24-25 See also Brown v Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, PP 14-18, Argyle v Jones, 
2005 UTApp 346, PP 10-15 
Hei e, the Andiews landowners (Verness Andrews, Delos Andrews, and Oral Tayloi) plainly 
testified—and Kay does not dispute—that they believed the Original Fence maiked the boundaiy 
between the Kay Pioperty and the EBF Property (Factual Background, Yl 32, 46, 53 (quoting, 
respectively, Veiness Andrews Depo at 17, Delos Andrews Depo at 22-23, Oial Taylor Depo at 
2 ] -22)) Tom and Dale Fowkes gave the same testimony (Factual Background, ^ 17,25 (quoting, 
) espectively, Tom Fowkes Depo at 1 8, Dale Fowkes Depo at 22-24) ) 
The activities of the Andi ews and Fowkes families also plainly confoimed to then subjective 
beliefs about the boundaiy as maiked by the Ongmal Fence Foi example, Delos Andiews testified 
that the Andiews grazed then cattle up to the fence line and that the Fowkes diy fanned up to the 
fence line (Delos Andrews Depo at 19 ) The fact that the parties farmed and giazed up to the fence 
line stionglv suggests boxh Jkmbes "iecognize[d] and tieat[ed]" the Ongmal Fence "as the 
boundary[ ]" Ault v Holden, 2002 UT 33, PI 8 This mutual recognition and acceptance of the 
Original Fence as the boundary is also evidenced by the fact that both the Andiews and the Fowkes 
families peifoimed lepan work on the fence (Factual Background 1fl[ 44, 61 (citing Delos Andrews 
Depo at 16,1 om Fowkes Depo at 45, Dale Fowkes Depo at 34) ) 
Kay aigues that "the evidence shows that dunng the owneiship of the Andiews, the time 
penod m which [pjlamtiff asseits the acquiescence occuned, the pnmaiy function of the Fence was 
to keep then livestock out of the Fowkes5 ciops " (Kay Fust SJ Mem at 19 ) Kay also notes that m 
this case there is no evidence as to why the Fence was onginally built {Id) Citing Hancock v 
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Planned Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990) and other cases, Kay argues that where the 
alleged primary function of the Original Fence was to control livestock, the Fence cannot be 
evidence of acquiescence. (Kay First SJ Mem. at 18-19.) See also Jorgensen, 2006 UT App P 17 
(discussing "the importance of the purpose of a fence" in the boundary by acquiescence analysis) 
(citation omitted). Kay's argument concerning the purpose or function of the fence does not persuade 
the Court that acquiescence did not occur. While the purpose or function of a fence is relevant to the 
acquiescence analysis, see id., such a purpose or function does not preclude the conclusion that, 
whatever a fence's function, the relevant landowners acquiesced to the fence as a boundary. The 
purpose of a fence is but one consideration in the overall question of mutual acquiescence. Indeed, 
here, the Andrews' testimony confirms their regard for the fence as a boundary, even as the fence 
functioned to control cattle. (See Delos Andrews Depo. at 16 (testifying the Andrews family "from 
time to time . . . did, with our neighbors, do a certain amount of repair on [the Fence] to keep it 
in—to keep the cattle out of our neighbors 'property.") (emphasis added); Verness Andrews Depo. 
at 23 ("There was no dispute about the boundary. The fence was the boundary. They, they didn't say, 
'You got to move your fence' or anything else. They said, 'Your cows are on my property.'" 
(emphasis added); id. at 15 ("couple of times we had some wayward cows and they went through 
the fence. And that doesn V make good neighbors, but some of the fence was older. It was rusty wire 
so we had to replace the fencing when we went to the livestock operation.") (emphasis added).) 
The parties do not contest that their predecessors never had any discussion or discussions 
about the Fence, or whether the Fence was or was not a boundary. Factual Background, *[[ 59. As 
noted in Veibell, however, "[ajcquiescence may also be^shown by silence, or the failure of a party 
to object to a line as a boundary." 2004 UT P 25. Here, as in Stoker, "[t]here is no indication in the 
record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief that the fence 
line was the boundary." 785 P.2d at 420. The Court notes that its conclusion of mutual acquiescence 
is not based solely on the silent and implicit acquiescence by the former landowners but also their 
affirmative acts described above. 
This case may also be distinguished from the recent cases of Brown v. J or gens en and Argyle 
v. Jones. In Jorgensen, the Court of Appeals of Utah concluded that while one of the adjoining 
landowners "subjectively believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually 
communicated their belief to [the adjoining landowner], either by word or action. Therefore, there 
was no 'actual acknowledgment... that the parties treat the Fence as the common boundary.'" 2006 
UT P 16. Additionally, the court noted the trial court's finding that one of the adjoining landowners 
commissioned an informal survey of his parcel "showed an unwillingness to acknowledge the Fence 
as the boundary," and that his unwillingness was factually "sufficient to defeat the doctrine." Id No 
evidence of a similar unwillingness to acknowledge the Fence in this case has been presented. 
Likewise, in Argyle v Jones, the Court of Appeals noted three facts found by the district court that 
were suggestive of non-acquiescence: (1) that the Joneses "had 'minimal' contact with the disputed 
property for the purpose of maintaining a well located near the southwest boundary [,]" which the 
Court of Appeals found was, "however minimal," not consistent with acquiescence; (2) the Joneses 
had knowledge of the true (record) boundary prior to their purchase of the disputed property; and (3) 
the Joneses had "consistently paid taxes on the property since purchasing it in 1961." 2005 UT P 15. 
"The knowing payment of taxes on the disputed property . . . is inconsistent with acquiescence." Id. 
Here, unlike Argyle, there appears to be no evidence of even "minimal" contact suggestive of non-
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acquiescence by the Fowkes and Andiews families, no evidence that the families had laiowledge of 
a conflicting lecoid boundaiy pnoi to then pui chases 01 leception of the adjoining pioperties, and 
no evidence that the Fowkes family made "blowing payment of taxes on the disputed pi opei ty " Id 
(emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The Couit notes that Kay's motion foi partial summaiyjudgment appeals to seek to establish 
a boundaiy othei than the Original Fence m accoidance with the Ludlow suivey lefeienced in 
Paragiaph 4 of the Factual Background above The Court concludes that a boundaiy had been 
established dining the mutual acquiescence of the Fowkes and Andiews families pnoi to Kay's 
pui chase of the piopeity, and that legal title to the Disputed Piopeity pieviously vested in EBF's 
piedecessois-m-mteiest and has now theiefoie vested in EBF up to the location of the Ongmal 
Fence See Viebell, 2004 UT P 31 (cc[o]nce adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary foi 
a long penod of time, the opeiation of the doctime of boundaiy by acquiescence is not vitiated by 
a subsequent discovery of the true lecord boundaiy by one of the parties ") The Court concludes no 
material issues of fact are m dispute and that judgment may be gi anted as a mattei of law The Court 
accordingly giants EBF's requests m full, and does not reach Kay's claims of a diffeient boundaiy 
based on the Ludlow suivey 
First, on its quiet title claim, EBF is granted (1) a judgment and deciee of quiet title to the 
disputed piopeity in favoi of EBF and against Kay, (2) a judgment and a deciee (a) declaring that 
Kay and any otheis claiming through him, have no light, title, estate, mteiest m, or hen upon, the 
disputed property, and (b) peimanently enjoining Kay, and all otheis claiming thiough him, from 
encioaching upon oi asserting any adveise claim to the disputed pioperty, and (3) an ordei lequnmg 
Kay to lemove the new fence constructed on the disputed property Second, as to its trespass claim, 
EBF is granted a judgment m its favoi and against Kay, m an amount to be deteimined at a later 
time, foi damages caused by Kay's trespass upon the disputed property EBF additionally is granted 
an oi dei dismissing Kay's cause of action foi quiet title with prejudice Accoidmgly, Kay's motion 
foi partial summary judgment and motion to stiike are denied 
EBF shall prepare and submit the appropriate order m confoimity with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Pioceduie 
sdlthis lO 
a 
Signe  \ b s iO_ day of May, 2008 
DCWALD! EYRE 
Distnct Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on tire day of May, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RULING AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DEFENDANT STEVEN L. KAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE to be delivered to tire following 
parties: 
Sherman C. Young 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 110 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo,Utah 84603 
Robert L. Janicki 
H. Burt Ringwood 
Strong & Harmi 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Ierk 
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